Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
History Theses & Dissertations

History

Spring 1993

Tobacco and Its Role in the Life of the Confederacy
D. T. Smith
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds
Part of the Economic History Commons, and the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, D. T.. "Tobacco and Its Role in the Life of the Confederacy" (1993). Master of Arts (MA), thesis, History, Old Dominion
University, DOI: 10.25777/25rf-3v69
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/30

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses &
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

TOBACCO AND ITS ROLE IN THE LIFE OF THE CONFEDERACY
by
D . T . Smith
B.A. May 1981, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
HISTORY
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
May, 1993

Approved by:
Harbld S. Wilson (Director)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Copyright by David Trent Smith © 1993
All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT
TOBACCO AND ITS ROLE IN THE LIFE OF THE CONFEDERACY
D . T . Smith
Old Dominion University, 1993
Director: Dr. Harold S. Wilson

This study examines the role that tobacco played in
influencing Confederate policy during the American Civil
War.

Surprisingly, very little research has been done on

this subject; historians have virtually ignored the
influence of tobacco upon Southern economic interests
between 1850 and 1870.
The southern tobacco-producing states grew 439,183,561
pounds of raw tobacco in 1860.

Southern manufactured

tobacco was worth $21,820,535 in 1860, and along with other
agricultural products, especially cotton, played an
important economic, political, and diplomatic role in the
life of the Confederacy.

The tobacco industry represented a

very strong interest group in the Upper South during the
Civil War.
After the war, tobacco emerged again as the principal
cash crop of the Upper South, as consumption became a
national pastime.
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CHAPTER 1

THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN TOBACCO INDUSTRY
From the days of John Rolfe and the fledgling English
colony at Jamestown until the 1850s, tobacco was a major
agricultural interest to Virginia, the South, and of course,
the nation.

Even though the South's cotton yield was much

more economically profitable over the years, the "older
staple continued to be the principal money crop for a large
part of the Upper South.

Tobacco in certain areas was

hardly less important than cotton in the Gulf states."1
Cotton was indeed the cornerstone of "King Cotton"
diplomacy;2 cotton was at the hub of social, commercial,
political, and diplomatic activity in the South during the
‘Joseph C. Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom (Durham:
University Press, 1938), viii.

Duke

2In layman's terms, "King Cotton" diplomacy refers to
the time-honored principle which claims that the
agricultural commodity of cotton was all-important to the
political, economic, and diplomatic interests of the
Confederate States of America. The Confederacy believed
that England and France would politically recognize and
militarily support the Confederate States of America in its
struggle against the United States in exchange for a steady
supply of cotton.

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

Confederate era.3
This study, however, will examine the primary role that
tobacco played in the institutions of the South from 1850 to
1870.

Several important volumes have been written about

"King Cotton" culture and diplomacy, but very little has
been said about the primacy of tobacco to the economic and
political interests of the Confederacy.4
3Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy—Foreign
Relations of the Confederate States of America (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1931). Owsley's King Cotton
Diplomacy is considered to be the authoritative study of
Confederate foreign diplomacy, and the crucial role that
cotton played therein.
4Joseph C. Robert's The Tobacco Kingdom is recognized
as a thorough examination of tobacco cultivation from its
inception at Jamestown to the modern manufacturing and
marketing strategies of the twentieth century. The only
glaring omission of Robert's highly-acclaimed effort is the
absence of documentation of the Confederate tobacco industry
during the war. Robert does a commendable job in his
description of the antebellum and postbellum tobacco
industries; his volume, however, fails to address
significant existing documentation which reinforces the
validity of the concept of "King Tobacco." B.W. Arnold's
History of the Tobacco Industry in Virginia from 1860-1894
relies heavily upon statistical data gleaned from the
agricultural and manufacturing schedules of the seventh,
eighth, ninth, and tenth census reports. Arnold's study is
very much data-based and provides the reader with a fairly
well-rounded quantitative study of the tobacco industry
following the Reconstruction. His work, however, is also
incomplete as a result of his failure to address important
issues and developments that pertain to the war years.
Nannie Mae Tilley's The Bright Tobacco Industry, 1860-1929
is accepted as the definitive inspection of the cultivation,
curing, and manufacture of bright tobacco in Virginia and
North Carolina. Tilley's highly-regarded work is tradeoriented, however, and is without any historical
documentation of the tobacco industry as it existed during
the Civil War. Several articles have been published on this
subject. Bingham Duncan's "Franco-American tobacco
diplomacy" (Maryland Historical Magazine, vol. 51) is an
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The tobacco planters and manufacturers of Virginia and
North Carolina provided the nation as well as the world with
a product unsurpassed in terms of economic demand and
profit.

Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri grew significant

quantities of tobacco prior to the Civil War; in 1860,
Kentucky grew 108,126,840 pounds, Tennessee 43,448,097
pounds, and Missouri 25,086,196 pounds.5 The largest
quantities and best quality of tobacco that was grown in the
United States grew in the tobacco heartland of the future
Confederate States of America:

Virginia and North

Carolina.6
As of 1850, the cities of Richmond, Lynchburg,
Danville, and Petersburg were established as the premier
tobacco manufacturing centers in the Old South.7

The

excellent examination of the diplomatic role that tobacco
played in American foreign policy before the war. W.F.
Spencer's "French Tobacco in Richmond" (Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography, vol. 71), captures the essence of the
controversy which described the Confederacy's attempt to
transport French-owned tobacco from Richmond to France
through the Federal naval blockade in 1863-1864. Frank L.
Olmstead's "Tobacco Tax of 1863 to 1864" (Quarterly Journal
of Economics, vol. 5), focuses on the taxation policies of
the Federal government on tobacco in 1863 and 1864.
5U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863). Also
see Appendix 12 on page 129.
Virginia and North Carolina produced a crop of
roughly 155,000,000 pounds that was valued at nearly
$15,000,000 in 1860.
7B.W. Arnold, History of the Tobacco Trade in Virginia
from 1860-1894 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), 58.
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nationally and internationally renowned Virginia tobacco
leaf, lump, and twist was grown, processed, manufactured,
and shipped out from this highly-prized agricultural region
by wealthy and influential planters, merchants, and
manufacturers.8
Tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr., of Richmond,
William T. Sutherlin of Danville, David Dunlop of
Petersburg, and Augustine Leftwich of Lynchburg, were among
the wealthiest and most successful manufacturers of their
respective cities during the 1850s.

In 1850 the Thomas

tobacco factory, one of the largest in Richmond with ninety
hands in both slave laborers and hired operatives, made
600,000 pounds of chewing tobacco valued at $120,000.
Thomas's business practically doubled between 1850 and 1860.
At the latter date it employed 150 hands—more than any other
Richmond factory-and made 1,100,000 pounds of chewing
tobacco valued at $225,000.9 The breadth and scope of
Sutherlin's tobacco business mirrored that of his
counterpart in Richmond.
By 1850, Sutherlin's labor force numbered forty, and
he manufactured tobacco worth $55,000. In less than
10 years, his factory, clearly the most extensive in
all Pittsylvania County, employed seventy-five hands
and produced 435,000 pounds of the manufactured
product valued at $97,732. Sutherlin's slave
8Please see Appendix 1 on page 113 for figures which
reflect the capital worth of prominent tobacconists of
Virginia during the antebellum period.
9Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 195.
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ownership increased from twenty-seven to forty
between 1850 and I860.10
Dunlop's tobacco enterprises "specialized in the export
trade and produced 400 tons of lump and twist tobacco
annually; he employed between 110 and 300 hands each year in
the decade of 1850.1,11 Manufactured tobacco was commonly
referred to as lump or chewing tobacco.

"Twist" tobacco was

a variety of chew which was produced by twisting several
kinds of tobacco together.
Thomas, Sutherlin, Dunlop and Leftwich were not the
only major influential tobacconists of Richmond, Lynchburg,
Danville, and Petersburg.

J.H. Grant and William Barrett

were also very wealthy and successful tobacco manufacturers
in Richmond; they were worth $350,000 and $100,000,
respectively, in 1850.

Bird L. Ferrell and his son Peter W.

Ferrell worked in conjunction with Sutherlin's enterprises
in Danville.

J.W. Holland also had a successful tobacco

factory in Danville.

W.B.B. Walker and Doctors Madison

Pendleton and William J. Pendleton were active in the
tobacco trade in northern Louisa County, just north of
10Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 179-80; U.S. Census,
1850: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia; U.S. Census, 1860:
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia.
"Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 186; U.S. Census, 1850:
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia; U.S. Census, 1860:
Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia.
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Richmond.12 The biographical profile of James Thomas, Jr.,
reflects the general background of the successful antebellum
tobacco manufacturer.

Thomas was a middle-aged (born in

Caroline County, Virginia, 1806) entrepreneur whose tobacco
career began in 1829, when he obtained the local agency to
buy tobacco for the French government.

By the 1850s,

Thomas's manufactured tobacco was well-known nationally as
well as internationally, putting him at the front of the
southern tobacco industry.13
Hundreds of tobacco merchants, agents, and traders
patronized the major tobacco manufacturers of the Richmond
vicinity; many tobacconists of the North, the Deep South,
and the West were faithful customers of Virginia's
antebellum tobacco industry.14 Tobacco grown and processed
in Virginia possessed a great demand overseas and was
exported to such far-flung places as Great Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Holland, and Australia.15
The antebellum tobacco trade of the 1850s was
12Refer to Appendices 5-14 to see manufacturing
schedules from the census of 1850 and 1860 in order to view
the quantity and value of tobacco manufactured by
tobacconists in Richmond, Lynchburg, and Danville during the
antebellum period.
13Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 265-68.
14The names and home cities of many antebellum
tobacconists are listed on page 115 of Appendix 2.
15The names and home cities of thirteen foreign
tobacconists are listed on page 117 of Appendix 3.
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influenced by events such as the California gold rush of the
early 1850s and the secession of South Carolina on 20
December 1860.
A San Francisco tobacconist, J.H. Coghill, described
the California tobacco trade in 1852 as "one of the
strangest markets in the world."16 Virginia tobacconist
James Thomas, Jr. established a virtual monopoly on the
California tobacco market in the early 1850s as a result of
his "style of packing and putting it up in bright, new
fancy-looking boxes."17 The lure of gold attracted a steady
influx of tobacco-consuming miners to California; "business
was good, as every steamer brought its full complement of
passengers, besides the thousands who arrived in sailing
vessels"18 on a regular basis.

Chewing and smoking tobacco

were prized by San Francisco's thousands of miners.
The shipments of Virginia tobacco to points west of
the Mississippi River involved both rail and river
transportation; in winter months ice, wind, and snow clogged
the thoroughfare of both venues.19 Frequently, tobacco was
16J .H . Coghill to James Thomas, Jr., San Francisco, 13
January 1852, James Thomas, Jr. Papers (hereafter cited as
Thomas Papers), Special Collections, Perkins Library, Duke
University.
17J.H. Coghill to James Thomas, Jr., San Francisco, 5
May 1859, ibid.
:8Ibid.
I9Heald, Bucknor and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Philadelphia, 21 January 1852, ibid.
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shipped by rail from Richmond to Baltimore to Pittsburgh;
the westbound cargo was then moved through Cincinnati and
Louisville upon the Ohio River to St. Louis.

The article

was transported south on the Mississippi from St. Louis
through Memphis to the deep-water port of New Orleans, where
it was loaded upon vessels for its final destination, San
Francisco, California.20 Tobacco-laden vessels then
completed the long, arduous journey to California by sailing
around Cape Horn of South America to San Francisco.

Tobacco

manufacturers were cautioned to "put up" their tobacco
carefully in order to protect the valuable leaf from molding
while it endured the long eight-month journey from Richmond
to San Francisco.21
Virginia's 209 tobacco factories manufactured
$5,157,652 worth of tobacco from a total crop of 56,803,227
pounds in 1850, using the labor of 4,802 male and 477 female
factory operatives.

Seven tobacco factories in Richmond

manufactured at least $100,000 worth of tobacco in 1850.

By

1860, 261 of the South's 409 tobacco factories were located
in Virginia.

Virginia's tobacco crop of 1860 was

123,968,312 pounds, with a labor force of 11,321 males and
2,300 females producing a manufactured tobacco product
20James Wilson to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 13 May
1852, ibid.
21Charles M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York,
28 January 1852, ibid.
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valued at $12,236,683.

Eighteen factories in Richmond

produced at least $100,000 worth of tobacco in I860.22
Complaints as well as compliments were included in
letters written by regional tobacconists to the planters and
manufacturers of the Richmond area.

Occasionally, Southern

tobacco agents accused Virginia manufacturers of selling
tobacco to them at prices higher than the rates charged to
their Northern counterparts.23 Some dealers even claimed
that tobacco supposedly produced in Virginia was actually
"counterfeit";24 others simply complained that "the price was
too high"25 for their particular interests.

On the other

hand, many Northern, Southern, or Western tobacco dealers
expressed delight:

"We are glad to see this tobacco coming

along, as we like to have some of it always on hand to
supply all the calls there may be for it."26
By the mid-1850s, a myriad of marketing costs were
saddled upon both producers and manufacturers alike.
Profits from sales to domestic and foreign agents, dealers,
22U .S . Census, 1860; see Appendices 5-14.
^J.C. Glenn to James Thomas, Jr., New Orleans, 5 May
1852, Thomas Papers.
24Fears and Putnam to J.C. Glenn and Co., Jackson,
Miss., 29 April 1852, ibid.
^Robert T. Dade to James Thomas, Jr., Mobile, 10 June
1854, ibid.
26Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 16
December 1859, ibid.
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and speculators were reduced as a result of freight, labor,
storage, and cartage charges.

The article had to be insured

against fire and loss at sea; in addition, the manufacturer
was expected to pay for the weighing, sampling, and
advertising of his tobacco.27 Commissions of anywhere from
three to seven percent, tolls, and cooperage rounded off the
expenses which were absorbed by the producer.28
Many changes in the Southern tobacco trade of the
mid-1850s affected tobacconists.

As early as 1854, "bright-

yellow" tobacco became a highly desirable commodity both
domestically and abroad; this variety of tobacco grew
primarily in Pittsylvania County, Virginia and Caswell
County, North Carolina.

It was prized for its value as a

smoking tobacco, and as a brightly colored wrapper for
manufactured chewing tobacco.29 The period also marked the
opening of new foreign markets.

As early as 1852, tobacco

produced in Richmond found its way into the Australian ports
of Adelaide, Melbourne, and Sydney via Richmond, Norfolk,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and London.
Australian firms such as McPherson and Company, Green,
^Charles M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 9
June 1860, ibid.
28Deane and Browne and Co. to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond,
17 May 1854, Madison and William J. Pendleton Papers
(hereafter cited as Pendleton Papers), Special Collections,
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
29E .G . Collier to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 30 June
1854, Thomas Papers.
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Heath, and Allen, Mailler, Lord, and Quereau, and Fisher,
Ricards and Company, all did business with James Thomas, Jr.
of Richmond, and frequently employed intermediary agents
based in New York City.30 Other trends in the Southern
antebellum tobacco industry included agricultural reform.
The use of guano as a rich source of fertilizer for the
prized plant increased.31

Extra care was given to the drying

of the leaf and tobacco marketing became more specialized.32
Chewing and smoking tobacco were distinguished by whether
they were bright or dark tobacco.33
In the late 1850s, many Richmond-based tobacconists
were confident that the industry was “getting better every
day."34 Many traders saw the "market as being active, and
with all good lump and leaf in dry order selling readily at
full prices,"35 with trade in Virginia tobacco exceptionally
30W.H. Wilkinson to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 18 May
1852, ibid.
31J.H. Motley to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond, 2 May 1855,
Pendleton Papers.
32Morton Armstead to W.B.B. Walker, Richmond, 28 March
1857, ibid.
33Buskirk and Dana to William T. Sutherlin, Portsmouth,
Va., 15 July 1858, William T. Sutherlin Papers (hereafter
cited as Sutherlin Papers), Special Collections, Perkins
Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
MBird L. Ferrell to William T. Sutherlin, Richmond, 11
October 1858, ibid.
35Morton Armstead to William B.B. Walker, Richmond, 2 3
February 1857, Thomas Papers.
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brisk in Northern cities as well as in London and
Liverpool.36
But problems did surface.
often ran out.

Some northern suppliers

One New York tobacconist, J.L.S. Pendleton,

lashed out at his Danville-based supplier:
thinking about?

"What are you

We could have sold quite a lot today.

Wake

up and send us our order."37 German firms such as D.H.
Watjen Company, Boninger, Kramer and Company, and H.H. Meier
were enthusiastic customers of Richmond tobacco.38 Foreign
firms, such as these Bremen concerns, frequently requested
that original inspection samples of tobacco be forwarded
from Virginia prior to the actual shipment in order that the
article might be sold before its arrival.39
These indications of prosperity quietly vanished as
sectional differences over the slavery question gained
public attention.

After the John Brown raid in 1859,

serious concerns and fears troubled Northern and Southern
businessmen alike.

As the North and South became

increasingly polarized and hostile to one another, many
36John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
1 December 1859, ibid.
37J.L.S. Pendleton to J.M. Sutherlin, New York, 23 July
1859, Sutherlin Papers.
38D.H. Watjen to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3 January
1860, Thomas Papers; H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas,
Jr., Bremen, 2 January 1860, ibid.
39H.H. Meier and Co., to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 2
January 1860, ibid.
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Northern and Southern tobacconists aired their concerns in
business correspondence.
seemed grim to some!

The prospects for the future

In early 1860, Bucknor and McCammon of

Philadelphia wrote to James Thomas, Jr. of Richmond on 2
January, "We appear to be naturally sliding into civil war.
Still we hope the Great Orderer of events will prevent such
a calamity, and keep us a great and united people."40
Speculation ran rampant throughout the nation that the
country might be divided by secession.

A Boston tobacconist

wrote Thomas on 15 November 1860, and expressed his concern
for the well-being of the tobacco trade and the nation,
The present position of affairs certainly warrants
grave apprehensions as to the future. Though
hundred here believe or propose to believe, that all
this excitement will end in nothing, we must say we
have (and many of our friends have) very serious
fears as to the results. If the South does actually
secede there is no telling the amount of injury that
will result to all parts of the country. . . . While
bringing our business matters under as "close sail"
as possible and preparing for the future, we still
hope the threatened storm may blow over resulting in
no lasting damage to any part of the country. We
had no intention when we began this letter of
touching at all upon this subject— but your [those of
James Thomas, Jr.] remarks naturally led us to speak
of it and emboldened us to express our opinion. It
is a matter that we rarely allow ourselves to
introduce into a business letter.41
Tension and uncertainty gripped tobacconists in
regions north, south, and west of Richmond.

On 1 December

40Bucknor and McCammon to James Thomas, Jr. ,
Philadelphia, 2 January 1860, ibid.
41J.H. and S.G. Thayer to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 15
November 1860, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

1860, John Ward, a Louisville tobacconist and a steady
customer of James Thomas, Jr., declared that "everything has
come to a deadlock and what is to be the result of our
trouble is known only to God."42 Another western tobacco
dealer, A.J. Seemullen of St. Louis, remarked to Thomas that
"the political troubles at the South have put a sudden and
unfortunate stop to business in our community, and for a
month past there has been literally nothing doing here."43
By mid-December of 1860, it became increasingly clear that
South Carolina would indeed secede from the Union.

The

integrity of the Southern tobacco trade rested with the
fortunes of the nation.

J.B. Carroll, a tobacco dealer from

Portland, Maine noted that "I hope things work out soon and
the Union be saved but fear from present appearances South
Carolina will secede and the government wil 1 iX5c force to
preserve the Union."44 While visiting Cincinnati, Thomas C.
Williams, a Richmond-based tobacconist and a confidante of
James Thomas, Jr., observed that "an immense trade and
prosperous times would have been had this fall and spring
but for the political troubles which are heaped upon the
42John Ward to James Thomas, Jr., Louisville, 1
December 1860, ibid.
43A.J. Seemullen to James Thomas, Jr., St. Louis, 3
December 1860, ibid.
^J.B. Carroll to James Thomas, Jr., Portland, 3
December 1860, ibid.
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Palmetto state out here."45 Just days prior to the secession
of South Carolina, Adams Frost, a prominent tobacco dealer
in Charleston, predicted that "we expect to go out of the
Union this week and then we can't say what will be the
course of things."46
South Carolina's fateful decision to secede from the
Union on 20 December 1860 disrupted the South's antebellum
tobacco industry.

A New Orleans firm complained that

"business is still very much depressed and though we
anticipate better sales, yet one can as yet see no end to
the political and financial troubles."47

Southern

preoccupation with the political and economic turmoil of the
times was reflected accurately by Charleston tobacconist
Adams Frost, who wrote James Thomas, Jr., on 24 December
1860 that:
though we have seceded, we have not yet stopped
communication altogether with the rest of the world.
We send letters by mail as usual—whether this will
be stopped in a day or two, and also the Customs
House, depends upon a resolution of the Convention
now in session, who are considering the matter.48
The arrival of 1861 did nothing to dispel the dark
45T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Cincinnati, 5
December 1860, ibid.
^Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 17
December 1860, ibid.
47Van Benthuysen and Crofton to James Thomas, Jr., New
Orleans, 25 December 1860, ibid.
48Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 24
December 1860, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

foreboding which gripped Northern and Southern tobacconists
on the subjects of trade and war.

J.A. and T.A. Patterson

of New York expressed their fear that "we can not see
through present political troubles.
can.

Mr. Seward thinks he

We confess all looks dark to us."49 Bucknor, McCammon,

and Co. of Philadelphia feared much "on account of our
political troubles and the disastrous effects on the
industry and the trade of the country."50 Fear was sometimes
offset by the cautious hope that "an early settlement of
existing political troubles and a restoration of confidence
would restore an active and satisfactory tobacco business."51
Stress and uncertainty characterized the American tobacco
trade at this time.

However, Northern firms were initially

hesitant to focus hostility on southern manufacturers such
as James Thomas, Jr. or William T. Sutherlin.

Northern

tobacco dealers clung to the hope that a swift conclusion to
the country's political differences would once again restore
order to the tobacco trade between northern and southern
states.
When war became more imminent as a result of the
secession of the remaining six states of the Deep South, the
49J .A . and T.A. Patterson to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 1 February 1861, ibid.
50Bucknor and McCammon to James Thomas, Jr.,
Philadelphia, 7 January 1861, ibid.
5IWilliam H. Price to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 7
January 1861, ibid.
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Virginia tobacco market was "entirely at a stand."52 Trade
with Northern and foreign firms became paralyzed.

A.J.

Seemullen of St. Louis remarked that "no business has been
done here worthy of note since Lincoln's election."53 One
Chicago concern simply severed its ties to Virginia
manufacturers because "the present prospects before us make
us feel disinclined to give any orders."54 A dealer from
Philadelphia lamented that "the spring tobacco trade will
not be much more than one half that of last year."55 Some
tobacco speculators in the North believed that northern
tobacco consumers might not buy tobacco manufactured in the
South as a result of the secession of the states of the Deep
South.

Northern dealers refused to take the economic risk

of importing southern tobacco until they were certain that
it could be sold without loss to consumers.

Some British

and Australian tobacco interests suggested that Virginia
heal up the sectional difficulties of the nation56 so that
mutually profitable trade could once again resume.

Tobacco

52Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 15
February 1861, ibid.
53A.J. Seemullen to James Thomas, Jr., St. Louis, 22
February 1861, ibid.
^G. Frankenthal and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 26
February 1861, ibid.
55Motzer and Boehm to James Thomas, Jr., Philadelphia,
1 April 1861, ibid.
56Greene, Heath, and Allen to James Thomas, Jr., San
Francisco, 28 February 1861, ibid.
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commerce upon the high seas was also threatened by the
prospect of a Federal naval blockade upon the ports of the
newly-created Confederate States of America.

Tobacco

manufacturers in the Richmond vicinity anticipated with
apprehension a blockade and its influence upon British and
Confederate ships.57 With spring in full bloom in the South,
the divided nation faced civil war.

The destiny of the

Confederacy, and its tobacco industry, lay in the hands of
those forces which collided at Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861.
On the eve of the Civil War, tobacco in the South
ranked second in the number of hands employed, third in
value of product, and fourth in capital investment when
compared to three other major Southern staples:
grain, and cotton.58

lumber,

Southern tobacco planters enjoyed

bumper crop yields in the years 1859 and 1860; in 1859,
tobacco was second in economic importance only to cotton
($21,000,000 to $161,000,000).59 In 1859, the entire
continent of Europe imported 254,004,557 pounds of tobacco
from around the world.

Europe's two largest tobacco

consumers, Great Britain and France, gained $26,267,160 and
$36,000,000 respectively from duties placed upon tobacco
57J.T. Doswell to James Thomas, Jr., New Orleans, 27
February 1861, ibid.
58Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, viii.
59U .S . Congress, House of Representatives, Tobacco
Trade, 36th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. Report no. 667, 25 June
1860, 5.
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imported from the United States in 1859 alone.60 British
duties placed on American tobacco were three shillings plus
five percent per pound of leaf tobacco and nine shillings
plus five percent per pound of manufactured tobacco.

French

duties fluctuated from $1.86 to $2.57 per kilogram of
tobacco leaf in 1859.61

In 1860, Virginia and North Carolina

tobacco yields netted 123,968,312 pounds and 32,853,250
pounds, respectively, of the valuable leaf; the Commonwealth
of Virginia grew sixteen million pounds of tobacco more than
its nearest competitor, the Commonwealth of Kentucky.62
Before the war, Britain and France were the largest
foreign consumers of Southern tobacco; in 1860, Great
Britain alone consumed sixty million pounds of tobacco, with
more than half of this amount being imported from the United
States.

Three-fourths to four-fifths of all tobacco

consumed in France in 1860 also originated in the United
States.

Later, some speculators in the foreign tobacco

trade predicted that the French Emperor Louis Napoleon would
break the blockade in order to insure himself a reliable and
continuous supply of morale-sustaining tobacco for his
legion of 600,000 soldiers.63
“Ibid.
6IIbid.
62Arnold, History of the Tobacco Trade, 19.
63New York Times, 2 October 1861, editorial.
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The importance of the Old Dominion to the Southern
tobacco industry preceded its primacy as the political
nucleus of the Confederacy, with Richmond, Petersburg,
Danville, and Lynchburg being the most important Confederate
tobacco production centers at the outbreak of war.64
Richmond "was clearly the tobacco manufacturing center of
the nation, if not the world.

No city, north, south or west

equalled Richmond in the value of its product."65
Virginia tobacco (that which was grown in Virginia
and North Carolina) was superior to any grown elsewhere in
the country because of reasons ranging from the soil
composition and climate of the region to superior
manufacturing techniques.

Tobacco of the highest quality

was found only in the Upper South; the southern antebellum
tobacco manufacturing kingdom was wholeheartedly absorbed by
the Confederate States of America when the four states of
the Upper South (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Arkansas) seceded from the Union in 1861.
M In 1860, there were 261 tobacco factories in
Virginia; 158 were located in: Richmond (52) , Lynchburg
(47), Danville (39), and Petersburg (20). The remaining 103
tobacco mills were distributed through small towns and
county districts. U.S. Census, 1860; also, see Appendices
12-14.
65Robert, The Tobacco Kingdom, 187.
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CHAPTER 2

TOBACCO:

A MISMANAGED CONFEDERATE ASSET

Tobacco was a primary economic commodity and an
invaluable resource for the Confederate States of America.
The regulation and taxation of southern tobacco was closely
monitored by Confederate authorities, and provided the South
with a dependable source of revenue.

Tobacco was an

agricultural article which figured heavily into the
political decisions made by the Confederate government
during the war.
Unfortunately, the Confederate domestic tobacco trade
was at a virtual standstill in the South by December 1863.1
War had a damaging effect upon the health of the Confederate
tobacco industry.

However, Confederate policy was

inevitably far more detrimental than war to the economic and
political potential that tobacco presented to the interests
of the Confederate States of America.

Confederate tobacco

policy was inconsistent, contradictory, and misconstrued.
Poorly designed tax policy and harmful legislation prevented
tobacco from becoming the valuable diplomatic asset the
'J.H. Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr., Augusta,
Georgia, 8 December 1863, Thomas Papers.
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Confederacy had hoped it would be.
How did the Confederacy apply its tobacco policy to
its economic and political interests during the war?

What

factors prevented tobacco from becoming the Confederate
asset it should have been?

Why was Confederate policy more

destructive to the overall potential of tobacco than the
chaos and disruption of war?
Five factors which contributed to the eventual
paralysis of the Confederate tobacco trade during the war
were:
1)

the attack on Fort Sumter and the subsequent
commercial chaos which resulted;

2)

transportation and communication disruptions;

3)

the capture or destruction of tobacco by Federal
armies;

4)

impressment of tobacco and capital by Confederate
authorities;

5)

inconsistent, inappropriate, and misconstrued
policies of Confederate tobacco legislation which
governed tobacco taxation and regulation.

The first four factors were byproducts of war; all
had a damaging influence on the well-being of the
Confederacy's tobacco industry.

Ironically, it was the

final factor, Confederate policy, which had the most
devastating effect on the potential that tobacco presented
to Confederate interests during the war.
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The prosperity of Southern domestic tobacco commerce
was shattered by the turmoil which swirled around Fort
Sumter in April 1861; a Charleston-based tobacconist
surveyed this controversy with the prophetic observation
that "we are in constant expectation now of an attempt to
reinforce Fort Sumter, and we are fully prepared to meet it.
If it is attempted it will be a bloody fight and they can't
whip us."2 The usually brisk trade that Southern
tobacconists enjoyed before hostilities began dropped off
significantly after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter on
12 April 1861.

A Boston tobacconist lamented that "as to

trade, it is dull and inactive necessarily as from the
insanity of our national disturbances."3 The overwhelming
fear that resulted following the official commencement of
war fueled doubts about the future of Confederate tobacco
trade in New York4 and Philadelphia.5 Business between
tobacconists north and south of the Richmond area suffered
dramatically as the political schism widened between the
United States and the Confederate States.

"In the present

2Adams Frost to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston, 10
April 1861, ibid.
3Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 9 April
1861, ibid.
4C.M. Connolly to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 10
April 1861, ibid.
5Bucknor, McCammon and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Philadelphia, 16 April 1861, ibid.
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warlike attitude of the country, there seems to be a general
disinclination to do business."6 Anxious times prevailed as
the purveyors of Virginia tobacco sought to maintain their
business contacts across the country; tobacconists soon
realized that the future was gloomy and uncertain, at best.
As military hostilities intensified in 1861, tobacco
dealers in Boston7 and New York8 negotiated feverishly with
major Confederate tobacco manufacturers in order to
stockpile large quantities of the increasingly valuable
leaf.

At the same time, some Confederate tobacco dealers

feared their tobacco would be subjected to mob violence in
Northern cities.9 As war preparations became more intense
both in the North and the South, Northern military
provisions, including the use of naval blockade, slowly
squeezed off the flow of tobacco to cities north of the
Mason-Dixon line.

Richmond-area tobacconists responded to

this challenge by shipping their tobacco north upon vessels
flying the flags of foreign nations.10 Southern cities which
6J.T. Doswell to James Thomas, Jr., Nev; Orleans, 20
April 1861, ibid.
7J.H. and S.G. Thayer to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 24
April 1861, ibid.
8William H. Price to James Thomas, Jr., New York, 27
April 1861, ibid.
9Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 27 April
1861, ibid.
10Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 19
April 1861, ibid.
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were blockaded by the Federal navy later saw their tobacco
trade gradually dwindle to nearly nothing."
The Confederate tobacco trade was hampered by
interruptions in communication and transportation throughout
the war.

Mail delivery from Northern cities to all

secessionist states was suspended at the commencement of
hostilities between the North and South in April 1861.12
Northern tobacconists expressed their displeasure regarding
communication difficulties to their Southern counterparts:
"This hide-go-seek way of communicating with our good
Virginia friends is too bad and shameful in the extreme."13
Mail delivery between points within the Confederacy was
inconsistent and unreliable at best.

"Miscarriages in the

mail were often caused by the new postmasters who were not
acquainted fully with the distribution of the different
mails that they received."14 Mistakes were critical because
the vast majority of Southern tobacconists had relied upon
the mail in communicating with business associates
throughout the United States and abroad.
"Adams Frost and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Charleston,
30 May 1861, ibid.
12Bucknor and McCammon and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Philadelphia, 12 April 1861, ibid.
"Fisher and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Boston, 11 June
1863, ibid.
"William H. Deans to James Thomas, Jr., Fairfax Court
House, Va. , 1 September 1861, ibid.
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Tobacconists in the Richmond vicinity experienced a
great deal of difficulty in transporting their tobacco to
their customers living both in the North and the South.
After a year of war, Lincoln's naval blockade effectively
bottled up Southern ports; to complicate matters, ice and
snow frequently impeded the transportation of tobacco upon
inland waterways in the South during the winter months.
The Confederate government strictly controlled
railroad transportation; tobacco shipments slowed due to the
transfer of railroad cars to other lines in order to
transport troops to front lines.15 Also, Confederate rail
lines were occasionally severed by enemy sabotage.

In

addition, tobacconists throughout the Confederacy always
faced the possibility that their valuable cargo could be
confiscated by the enemy in an unexpected raid upon a
railroad or a warehouse.16 Rail transport became
increasingly difficult as tobacco had to be rerouted away
from rail lines which were occupied or destroyed by the
enemy.17 Troop transportation impeded the commercial flow of
1SR.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 7 March
1862, ibid.
16R.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 14
March 1862, ibid.
17J .H . Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr., Augusta,
Georgia, 11 December 1861, ibid.
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tobacco as well as other important commodities.18 The
evacuation of tobacco by boat was simply "out of the
question"19 while families, merchants, and officials all
grappled for the limited supply of river craft that was
commandeered for military use.

Tobacco subject to

confiscation by the enemy in North Carolina and Virginia was
generally moved out by rail into the country or was
transported to a major Southern city which was considered to
be safe.20 Some tobacconists panicked and sold their crop
while it still had some value; others stowed it away with
the hope that it would be valuable once the war was over or
when normality and stability returned to the tobacco
market.21
Richmond was at the nucleus of Virginia's rail
network.

The economic success of Richmond tobacco

manufacturers such as James Thomas, Jr., William Barrett,
James H. Grant, and Thomas C. Williams was closely linked to
the dependability and integrity of Virginia's railroads.
Tobacco was transported on each of Virginia's six major rail
lines; the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac, the Orange
18David G. Potts to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 21
March 1862, ibid.
19Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 23
February 1865, ibid.
20Ibid.
2ICharles B. Ball to William T. Sutherlin, Richmond, 3
March 1864, Sutherlin Papers.
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and Alexandria, the Virginia Central, the Petersburg and
Weldon, the Richmond and Danville, and the Southside were
all used by Confederate tobacco manufacturers and dealers in
the transportation of tobacco to market.

Federal advances

in the field of battle in 1861 and 1862 resulted in the loss
of strategic stretches of Confederate railroad.

The Federal

incursion into the Fairfax and Alexandria area prior to the
battle of First Manassas resulted in the loss of the
northern extreme of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
line.

Vital stretches of the Orange and Alexandria line

were also lost to the Federals in early 1862, making tobacco
shipping more difficult to western markets.

McClellan's

movement against Richmond in May of 1862 caused tobacconists
such as Thomas and Williams to ship quantities of
manufactured tobacco upon the Petersburg and Weldon railroad
to Wilmington and points south, where it was safely out of
the reach of the enemy.22 The communication and
transportation needs of the Confederate tobacco trade became
increasingly more difficult to satisfy as Union armies
gained control of vital southern cities such as Norfolk,
Nashville, Memphis, and New Orleans.
When major cities came under direct Federal assault
in late 1861 and early 1862, tobacco planters and
manufacturers feared for the safety of their tobacco,

York:

22Dougias Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants (New
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), 4:450-70, 477.
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machinery, and property.23 As Federal forces threatened
Richmond in May of 1862, the Confederate government ordered
that all tobacco in the city be placed in one central
location so that it could be burned if necessary without
destroying other property.24

Such governmental orders

generally affected Confederate tobacco men "like a clap of
thunder in a clear sky."25 William Barrett, a close friend
of James Thomas, Jr., and a prominent tobacconist from
Richmond, was unfazed by the threat of invasion:
I continue to indulge
vandals may not reach
to do so all my stock
least eighty thousand
into their hands, and
ashes.26

the hope that the Yankee
this place-should they be able
of my tobacco amounts to at
dollars will most likely fall
which I would sooner reduce to

In early 1862, tobacco planters, manufacturers, and
traders shared the concerns and uncertainties that were
predominant throughout the South.

Tobacconists in Southern

cities expressed their fears about the prospect of Federal
confiscation in their business correspondence.

In March and

April of 1862, tobacco dealers in the manufacturing and
^H. Harrison and Son to James Thomas, Jr., Nashville,
10 July 1861, Thomas Papers.
24Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 2
May 1862, ibid.
^Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 1
May 1862, ibid.
26William Barrett to William J. Pendleton, Richmond, 1
March 1862, Pendleton Papers.
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distribution centers of Richmond,27 Wilmington,28
Fredericksburg,29 Memphis,30 and Savannah31 all expressed
consternation at the stark prospect of being occupied by
Federal forces, and losing their tobacco to confiscation.
At this time, however, one Atlanta-based tobacconist, J.B.
Robonable, predicted that his enterprise was safe from the
effects of war: "This being in the heart of the South, we do
not think the Yankees will ever penetrate so far!”32
This independent spirit was evident in a statement
made by a tobacco manufacturer in Richmond at the time of
the Seven Days Battle in June 1862:
alarmed yet.

"I am not at all

I don't think the Yankees will ever get

here.”33 Tobacconists throughout the Confederacy attempted
to carry on with life and business despite the limitations
that the war presented.
27Coleman Wortham to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 24
April 1862, Thomas Papers.
28R.F. Lester to James Thomas, Jr., Petersburg, 24
March 1862, ibid.
29Castleman and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Fredericksburg, 8 March 1862, ibid.
30J .B . Sharpe and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Memphis, 16
March 1862, ibid.
31Joseph Sichel to James Thomas, Jr., Savannah, 18
March 1862, ibid.
32J.B. Robonable to James Thomas, Jr., Atlanta, 16
April 1862, ibid.
33Coleman Wortham to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 7 May
1862, ibid.
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The enemy did not present the only source of wartime
danger and disruption to the Confederate tobacco industry.
Southern tobacco planters and manufacturers were also
subject to the Confederate policy of impressment.

Field

hands, factory workers, slaves, and even tobacconists
themselves were subject to the Confederate draft for
military obligations as Lee's depleted army inducted new
members.

Many men of draft age in the tobacco business

complained that "a substitute cannot be had at any price,
but, I will try and get one in the country somewhere."34
While tobacco operations of Richmond factories were not
exempt from conscription, field hands that were necessary
for planting, plowing, and harvesting were difficult to find
for hire due to the overall shortages of manpower in the
South.35 As Union lines crept closer to the heartland of the
tobacco kingdom in 1863, slaves were more inclined to flee
to the safety which "Yankee" lines provided.36 Tobacconists
could expect their factories to be subject to impressment by
the Confederate government.

Tobacco machinery and

equipment, as well as the article itself, were vulnerable to
^H.W. Broadus to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 27
January 1863, ibid.
35H.W. Broadus to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 13
January 1863, ibid.
36Washington Duke to General James Cox, Durham, 27
October 1863, Washington Duke Papers, Special Collections,
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
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impressment as the Confederacy struggled to sustain its war
effort.37
At this time, necessity and practicality required the
Confederate government to take unusual steps to secure
quarters for captured Federal soldiers.

The Confederate War

Department took over a number of tobacco factories and
warehouses in Richmond during the war.

In 1861, Federal

prisoners captured during the battle of First Manassas were
housed in J.L. Liggon's and J.O. Harwood's factories in
Richmond; later in 1861, General John H. Winder commandeered
a tobacco warehouse owned by W.H. Gwaltney.

In 1862,

Confederate authorities converted the Scott and Pemberton
warehouses into Confederate prisons bearing the same names.
As more prisoners continued to stream into Richmond in 1863,
more space was required to accommodate them all.

The

tobacco factories of R.H. Mayo, J.H. Grant, Turpin and
Yarbrough, W.H. Ross, Crew and Pemberton, J.B. and A.L.
Royster, and William Barrett were all impressed by General
Winder.

In late 1863, four thousand prisoners from Richmond

were transferred to Danville where they were quartered in
six tobacco factories.38 The Confederacy also established
three military hospitals in Lynchburg which were housed in
37Thomas C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 29
April 1862, Thomas Papers.
38Henry Putney Beers, Guide to the Archives of the
Government of the Confederate States of America (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), 253-55.
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tobacco warehouses.39
As war materiel became increasingly more difficult
for the Confederate army to acquire, Confederate Secretary
of War James A. Seddon issued a directive permitting
necessary provisions for the army to be procured in exchange
for Southern tobacco and cotton.40 Seddon also empowered
Confederate officials with the authority to impress one half
of the tonnage of any Southern vessel carrying tobacco,
cotton, sugar, molasses, or rice for the purpose of raising
revenue or procuring war supplies.41
Confederate tobacco legislation had the most
overwhelmingly negative influence on the southern tobacco
industry.

The contradictory and unfocused nature of the

Confederacy's tobacco policy undermined the economic and
political benefits that the article presented.

Misconstrued

tax legislation added to the economic burden that tobacco
manufacturers were forced to bear within the Confederacy's
wartime economy.

Inappropriate regulations were also

imposed upon the cultivation, transportation, manufacture,
and sale of tobacco.

These self-inflicted impositions

39Ibid., 194.
40Seddon to Lee, Richmond, 19 February 1364, Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies in the War of
the Rebellion (hereafter cited as ORA), U.S. War Department
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901),
4th ser., III, 154.
41Declaration of Correspondence, Richmond, 5 March
1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 187.
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prevented the tobacco industry from becoming the asset the
Confederacy had hoped it would be.
From 1860 to 1865, the annual per capita consumption
of tobacco in the Confederate states was one and one-half
pounds.

This meant that the southern population (7,000,000)

annually consumed about 10,500,000 pounds of tobacco.42 The
Confederate government believed that the taxes derived from
this quantity of tobacco would be a significant source of
war-sustaining revenue.

Confederate tobacco policy, for

better or worse, evolved during the war in an awkward and
almost haphazard fashion.
Once the war started, Confederate officials were well
aware of the potential leverage that tobacco could provide
to foreign relations.

Therefore, in March 1861, the

Confederate Congress passed a resolution which "prohibited
the exportation of tobacco overseas unless in exchange for
munitions of war."43 The prohibition of Southern tobacco
commerce to Europe was designed to create a tobacco famine
in Europe which would invariably compel countries such as
Great Britain and France to attempt to break the Federal
blockade.

At this time, the Confederate House of

42Meyer Jacobstein, The Tobacco Industry in the United
States. Studies in History, Economic, and Public Law (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1907), no. 3, 26:44.
43Confederate States of America, Journal of the
Congress of the Confederate States of America, 1861-1865,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), March
1862, 5:256-57.
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Representatives passed a resolution designed to support the
war effort.

Tobacco was purchased by the government at one-

fourth its value in treasury notes; the remainder of the
article was paid for in Confederate bonds bearing eight
percent interest over twenty years.44
In the early months of the war, speculation ran
rampant in the Northern press in regard to the size and
potential of the Confederacy's upcoming tobacco and cotton
crops for 1861.45

Federal economists were already clearly

aware of the raw possibilities of Southern tobacco, cotton,
sugar, and rice.

Federal officials recognized that the

Confederacy's most likely chance at gaining Europe's
official political acceptance lay within the realm of
foreign attraction and dependence upon Southern agricultural
commodities.

Officials within Jefferson Davis's

administration realized the commercial and political
importance of the tobacco crop; in August 1861, the Congress
of the Confederate States of America passed an act which
specifically forbade the shipment of Southern tobacco to
European neutrals.46
The party with whom the Confederates were locked in
'“Southern Historical Society, Southern Historical
Society Papers (Richmond: William Byrd Publishing Co.,
1923), 18 March 1862, no. 6, 44:114-15.
i5New York Times, 12 July 1861.
46An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 2 August 1861, ORA, 4th ser., I, 529.
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mortal combat, the Federals, was also interested in catering
to the tobacco demands of Europe.

The U.S. government

placed a heavy tax on exported tobacco.47

In 1861, the

Confederate tobacco industry was enriched by $19,278,621 as
a result of tobacco revenue which was gained from tobacco
sales to Europe.

An additional $10,000,000 was earned from

tobacco sales to Northern concerns.48 French and British
entrepreneurs shared the concerns of Northern businessmen as
to what crops of tobacco, cotton, and grain would be planted
by Southerners in the spring of 1862.49
Confederate tobacco policy continued to develop in
April 1862 with a senatorial decision to acquire 30,000
hogsheads of tobacco (30,000,000 pounds) from Confederate
planters in exchange for bonds paying eight percent
interest.

This development resulted from an earlier act of

the Confederate Congress, Statute 117 of 16 May 1861.

This

provision established what came to be known as the Produce
Loan.

In an effort to raise $50,000,000, Secretary of the

Treasury C.R. Memminger authorized agents to purchase
tobacco and cotton in exchange for bonds paying eight
47United States. The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and
Proclamations of the United States of America (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1862), 37th Cong., 2nd sess., Ch. 119, 463.
ilDeBow's Magazine 32 (1862): 121-22.
49New York Times, 4 March 1862.
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percent interest.50 Provisions were made to allow the
Secretary of the Treasury to negotiate the sale of this
tobacco to England or France with the hope that political
recognition would result.51
Shortly thereafter, the Confederate Congress enacted
a resolution which prohibited the transportation of tobacco
to Confederate territory in possession of the enemy.52 The
Federal internal revenue act passed by Congress during the
summer of 1862 inadvertently aided the interests of the
Confederacy.

A heavy tax was placed upon tobacco grown in

the Union; this, coupled with importation regulations placed
on the leaf by Britain and France, increased the
desirability of Confederate tobacco, and its value as a
political bargaining chip.53 Strict laws and provisions were
imposed by Confederate legislators upon tobacco cultivation,
sale, and exportation as the importance of the leaf grew.
The Confederate Senate approved a bill in October 1862 which
permitted the impressment of tobacco by the Confederate
treasury for the purpose of its exportation to foreign
50Beers, 115.
51Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 2:454-55.
52ORA, 4th ser., I, 1077.
53Frank L. Olmstead, "Tobacco Tax of 1863 to 1864,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 5 (January 1891): 193-219.
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nations "sympathetic" to the Confederate cause.54 Tobacco
was subject to an increasingly heavy tax as the war consumed
the Confederacy's dwindling sources of revenue.55
Revenue generation continued to be of major interest
to the Confederacy in 1863.

The Confederate Congress

implemented an eight percent tax on all tobacco profits as
early as January 1863.

As inflation ran rampant and tobacco

sales bottomed out, tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr.
and Thomas C. Williams feared that their produce and
machinery would be taken by the government for failure to
pay taxes.56 The Congress of the Confederate States of
America added a two-and-one-half percent sales tax upon the
tobacco industry in March 1863; this legislation added to
the already heavy burdens felt by those in the Confederate
tobacco trade.57
The Confederate House of Representatives passed
another bill in early 1863 which provided for
an export duty on cotton and tobacco exported from
the Confederate States to the ports or in the ships
of any foreign country which has not recognized the
independence of the Confederate States of America.
A duty of forty cents per pound of raw tobacco shall
54Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 2:452-57.
55Arno Id, 21.
56T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 20
January 1863, Thomas Papers.
57William D. Quisenberry to James Thomas, Jr. ,
Richmond, 18 March 1863, ibid.
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be levied to provide revenue for the defense of the
Confederacy.58
One month later, the Virginia General Assembly
repealed a bill "to prohibit the production of tobacco as of
12 March 1863."59 This act had called for an increase in the
production of grain, and forbade the cultivation of tobacco
except in the case of domestic consumption.

As provisions

became more scarce for the Confederate armies in the field,
the Congress of the Confederate States of America passed a
joint resolution in April 1863 which banned the growth of
tobacco and cotton altogether, and ordered the production of
food crops in order to feed the hungry soldiers in gray.60
As economic and military developments worsened for
the Confederacy in 1863, the Confederate House of
Representatives relaxed its ban on tobacco cultivation and
passed a resolution which simply recommended that tobacco
planters not cultivate a crop during the year; this
recommendation suggested that planters grow crops of
consumable provisions instead to support the army and
58Marjorie L. Crandell, ed., Confederate Imprints: A
Checklist Based Primarily on the Collection of the Boston
Atheneum (Boston: Boston Atheneum, 1955), Confederate
States of America, House of Representatives, 5 February
1863, no. 21 (hereafter cited as Crandell).
S9Crandell, no. 2327.
“Joint Resolutions of the Congress of the Confederate
States of America, 4 April 1863, ORA, 4th. ser., II, 468.
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general populace.61 As war-sustaining revenue became scarce,
the Confederate House passed a tax on tobacco on 24 April
1863 which assessed the article on the basis of its grade
and quality.62 These provisions were not supplying the
Confederacy with the revenue they were intended to generate,
nor were they bringing Great Britain or France any closer to
recognizing or assisting the Confederate States of America.
Consequently, the Confederate Senate passed a resolution
that gave the government the authority to sell and dispose
of any tobacco in the possession of Confederate citizens.
This tobacco was consequently sold overseas at a price no
less than two hundred percent over the purchase price.

The

revenue from these tobacco sales was used to pay off
outstanding treasury notes.63
As times became increasingly desperate, influential
tobacconists such as James Thomas, Jr. of Richmond and
William T. Sutherlin of Danville used their social and
commercial stature as a means of lobbying for their
financial interests in the Confederate House and Senate in
Richmond.

Men of their wealth, power, and prestige were

advised by Congressmen such as Jabez Lamar Monroe Curry:
61Southern Historical Society Papers, no. 10, vol. 48,
1941, 191-92.
62Ibid. , no. 12, vol. 50, 1953, 299.
63Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 4:76-77.
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"In any matter connected with the government, of course, you
have but to intimate your wishes.

Your acquaintance with

the chief officers however will give you, at all times,
access to them."64 Lobbying by successful and influential
tobacconists like Thomas or Sutherlin nevertheless failed
largely because legislators from the cotton-producing states
of the Deep South fought hard to preserve the economic and
political integrity of their interests.

Most tobacco

legislation was designed and supported by Confederate
Congressmen from the Deep South.
While the Federal blockade continued to squeeze the
flow of Confederate tobacco and cotton to Europe, Great
Britain and France began to look to the United States for a
reliable supply of a quality grade of tobacco.

The lack of

Confederate tobacco upset the trade balance of the tobacco
market in Europe.

Thus, the regulation and taxation of

Northern tobacco became a primary concern of the United
States Congress until the end of the war.65 This fact did
not go unnoticed by the Federal Commissioner of the United
States Department of Agriculture, Isaac Newton.

In a

document addressed to the U.S. Senate in January 1864,
Newton expressed his concern that a tax on tobacco grown in
MJabez Lamar Monroe Curry to James Thomas, Jr.,
Richmond, 7 February 1863, Thomas Papers.
65United States. The Statutes at Large, 38th Cong., 1st
sess., 1864, Ch. 171, 203, 262, 475-77.
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the United States would be detrimental to Northern farmers,
and, in the long run, would contribute to the marketability
of Confederate tobacco.66 Almost simultaneously, the
Congress of the Confederate States of America approved an
act which was designed to "regulate the collection of the
tax in kind to tobacco, and to amend the act entitled 'An
act to levy taxes for the common defense and carry on the
Government of the Confederate States of America.' 1167
In the early spring of 1864, Confederate Adjutant and
Inspector General Samuel Cooper officially established and
implemented a monthly ration of tobacco to every enlisted
man in the Confederate army (this ration was three-quarters
of a pound per month) .68 This act was modified shortly
thereafter when the Confederate Senate passed two
resolutions which were designed to bring some moraleboosting comfort to the Confederate soldier.

The standard

monthly eight-dollar bounty (wage) of the common foot
soldier was complemented by a three-quarter-pound ration of
tobacco valued at three dollars.69

Soldiers had the option

^ . S . Congress, Senate, Letter of the Commissioner of
Agriculture, 38th Cong., 1st sess., Misc. Doc. 13, 1864.
67An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 30 January 1864, ORA, 4th ser., III, 63-64.
68An Act of the Congress of the Confederate States of
America, 17 February 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 299.
69Southern Historical Society Papers, no. 13, 51: 161,
1929.
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of electing smoking or chewing tobacco; the soldier could
also request the financial equivalent of his ration instead
of receiving tobacco.70
At this point in the war, some opportunistic
Southerners capitalized on the tobacco and cotton famine in
Europe, and engaged in the smuggling of these valuable
commodities.

The exportation of tobacco through Mexico to

either of the major European neutrals was strictly regulated
by the Confederate

Treasury and War Departments,71and

provided the Confederate States
source of revenue.

of America with a small

Orders were issued to General Robert E.

Lee to be vigilantfor the illegal transportation

of tobacco

whenever feasible.72 As a result, a surprisingly large
amount of Lee's time off the field of battle was spent
enforcing the regulations of the Confederate Department of
the Treasury.
In 1864, large chunks of Confederate territory fell
into the hands of the enemy.

The Confederate Department of

War issued orders which prohibited the exportation of
tobacco into any part of the Confederacy occupied by the
70Ibid. , no. 14, 52:345-46, 1930.
^Correspondence of the Confederate States of America,
Richmond, 11 March 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 206-7, 239-40.
^Seddon to Lee, Richmond, 23 March 1864, ORA, 4th
ser., Ill, 245-46.
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enemy.73 This provision was designed to deprive the enemy of
tobacco.
General Lee offered insightful suggestions as to the
prevention of tobacco smuggling by private entrepreneurs.
The general provided reasonable guidelines which outlined
the regulation and profit-sharing of revenue resulting from
the shipment of tobacco overseas.74 As the noose tightened
around the neck of the Confederacy, the Confederate House of
Representatives "imposed a duty on tobacco and an additional
duty on cotton which was exported from the Confederate
States of America"75 in an effort to raise desperately needed
revenue.
During the winter of 1864-1865, the Congress of the
Confederate States of America ordered the destruction of any
quantity of tobacco or cotton which could possibly aid the
enemy in its prosecution of the war.76 An editorial
published in DeBow's Magazine at this time demonstrated the
value which tobacco was considered to have to the
Confederate war effort:
Congress has acted wisely in requiring all the
73General Orders, no. 23, Richmond, 29 March 1864, ORA,
1st ser., LI, pt. 2, 842-43.
74Lee to Noland, Headquarters of the Army of Northern
Virginia, 12 April 1864, ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 285-87.
75Crandell, no. 477.
76General Orders, no. 4, Richmond, 8 February 1865,
ORA, 4th ser., Ill, 1066.
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cotton and tobacco in the Confederacy to be burned
when in danger of falling into the hands of the
enemy. This is legitimate warfare, and must tell
upon this contest. By destroying arms and
provisions and towns we gain little or nothing.
These they have without stint. Cotton and tobacco
are specie-gold and silver. We had as well
surrender the coffers of our banks into their hands
as these. They are more than specie. They are the
levers with which
the enemy can
move courts
and
cabinets at their
will. If the
great staples ofthe
South are to become the instruments of our
subjugation, let us have no more of them.77
Southern military defeats in mid- to late 1863 and
early 1864 sealed the fate of the Confederacy, as well as
its domestic tobacco trade.

Exorbitant tax and insurance

rates caused tobacco prices to skyrocket.
and railways remained

Major seaports

blockaded and occupied by

Federal armies occupied or were

theenemy.

laying siege to the

principal commercial and population centers of the South.
American specie became increasingly scarce as Confederate
currency became nearly worthless.

The domestic tobacco

trade of the Confederacy was at a virtual standstill by
December 1863 ,78 where it remained until the end of the war
Tobacco was an agricultural commodity which held great
promise in terms of the fortunes of Confederate domestic
policy.

Its failure foreshadowed that of Confederate

foreign trade and foreign diplomacy.
77DeBow's Magazine 33 (1862): 91.
78J.H. Pemberton to James Thomas, Jr. , Augusta,
Georgia, 8 December 1863, Thomas Papers.
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CHAPTER 3

CONFEDERATE TOBACCO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The thriving prosperity of the southern foreign
tobacco trace was shattered by the American Civil War.

The

Federal naval blockade which enveloped the Confederate coast
from the Potomac to the Rio Grade virtually ended the
Confederacy's international tobacco trade by the end of
1863.

Abraham Lincoln issued his proclamation of a naval

blockade of ports in the Confederate States of America on 19
and 27 April 1861.

The Union was actually capable of

effectively enforcing the provisions of the presidential
proclamation (at least in the capes of Virginia) on 30 April
1861.'
Although some Confederate tobacco did break through
the blockade via foreign vessels and Confederate blockade
runners, the flow of tobacco from southern ports to European
customers was slowly cut off.

As a result, European clients

began to patronize other countries for a steady and reliable
source of tobacco, among them being the United States of
America.

By 1863, the Confederate international tobacco

'Mountague Bernard, A Historical Account of the
Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War
(New York: Lennox Hall, 1971), 226-27, 234.
46
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trade was essentially neutralized as a direct result of the
effects of the naval blockade and competition from other
tobacco-producing nations.
Despite the obstacles and privations that the war and
blockade presented, Confederate tobacconists carried on a
surprisingly successful tobacco trade with their
counterparts in England, France, Holland, Germany, and
Australia.

Tobacco manufacturers of the Richmond vicinity

used ingenuity, guile, and sound business acumen to
counteract the suffocating effect of the Federal blockade.
When hostilities officially began in April 1861,
Confederate tobacconists across the broad expanse of the
North and South rushed off communications and orders to
their manufacturers and suppliers in Richmond.

Southern

tobacco dealers in port cities from Charleston to New
Orleans were all anxious to maintain their lucrative trade
with European tobacco houses.2 And, before the Federal
naval blockade was firmly in place, Northern tobacconists in
such places as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
and San Francisco feverishly attempted to secure final
shipments of tobacco before being forbidden to do so by the
2Among the Confederate tobacco dealers active in this
capacity in mid-April of 1861 were: Adams Frost
(Charleston), Van Benthuysen and Crofton (New Orleans), and
J.T. Doswell (New Orleans).
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Federal government.3 As requests poured into the offices of
major manufacturers in Richmond from points across the
country, concerns mounted that a reliable and steady supply
of Virginia tobacco would soon be next to impossible to
obtain.

Tobacco that was planted, cultivated, harvested,

cured, and packaged over the course of one calendar year was
not ready for market until January of the following year.
It was roughly a thirteen-month process.

Tobacco

manufacturers such as James Thomas, Jr. were extremely
anxious to export as much of the leaf as possible in April
and May 1861 due to the restricting factors of time and
blockade.

Conversely, tobacco dealers and speculators in

New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and San Francisco were
interested in acquiring as much Virginia tobacco as possible
both for northern consumption and for export to foreign
markets.

From 18 April 1861 to 1 May 1861 alone, James

Thomas, Jr. received shipment orders from the following
northern tobacco merchants:

Ludlam and Heineken, Fisher,

Ricards and Co., the Brothers Boninger, Mailler, Lord, and
Quereau, Greene, Heath, and Allen, and Mercer, Antello and
Co.

Northern dealers annually bought $10,000,000 worth of

3Among those Northern tobacco dealers struggling to
maintain their European trade at the outbreak of war in mid1861 were: J.H. and S.E. Thayer (Boston), Ludlam and
Heineken (New York), Fisher, Ricards and Co. (New York),
Mercer and Antello and Co. (Philadelphia), the Brothers
Boninger (Baltimore), and Greene, Heath, and Allen (San
Francisco).
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tobacco from southern manufacturers prior to the war.4
Leading Confederate tobacconists such as James
Thomas, Jr. of Richmond were more than happy to ship as much
tobacco overseas as possible upon vessels flying the flag of
either foreign countries, the United States, or the
Confederacy.

Thomas, mentioned earlier as the most

prominent tobacco manufacturer in the antebellum South,
continued his tobacco trade with European customers in
earnest during the war by shipping massive quantities of the
leaf, prior to the actual enforcement of the blockade, to
London's oldest and most respected tobacco firm, the house
of John K. Gilliat.5
Several colleagues of James Thomas, Jr., privately
questioned the tobacco magnate about his perceived excessive
caution and anxiety as to the possible outcome of the war,
as well as the future prosperity of trade with Europe.
Thomas, in his astute foresight, gave John K. Gilliat power
of attorney over all of his tobacco business dealings with
firms in Europe and Australia.

In doing so, Thomas was

virtually guaranteed of maintaining at least a portion of
his vast wealth of tobacco and profits.6 And, before the
workings of the blockade were in place, provisions were made
*DeBow's Magazine 32 (1862): 121-22.
5John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
29 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
6Ibid.
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by Thomas as well as other tobacconists in the Confederacy,
to

ship as much tobacco from Southern ports as possible to

eager customers

in Europe and Australia.

This spiritwas

evident in a letter written by Ludlam and Heineken and Co.
of New York to Thomas after the outbreak of war:
We write a hasty line to say that the news from
Washington city and the South—the certainty of a
blockade of all the Southern ports-the heavy orders
known to be here for tobacco for European markets—
the fact that speculators have entered in the market
and are operating very extensively—all these facts
conspire to make us believe that there never has
been a more favorable chance for speculators and
shippers of tobacco and we therefore beg leave to
advise large shipments from you.7
Shortly after receiving this advisory note, Thomas
received a message from Fisher, Ricards and Co. of
Melbourne, Australia; this firm had American officers based
both in San Francisco and New York.

"We have since the

great convulsion . . . suggested your making some shipments
to Australia; this we could confidently advise at this time
as general shipments have to a great extent ceased."8 By
the end of April 1861, Thomas was shipping tobacco to
Rotterdam and Amsterdam through Baltimore upon vessels of
foreign countries.9 Tobacco was also being sent from
7Ludlam and Heineken and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 18 April 1861, ibid.
8Fisher, Ricards and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 21 April 1861, ibid.
9Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 27
April 1861, ibid.
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Richmond to the New York office of the Australian tobacco
house of Mailler, Lord, and Quereau.

This tobacco was

subsequently shipped to Lord's home office in Melbourne.10
Another Australian firm, Greene, Heath, and Allen, wrote
Thomas and plaintively stated that "we cannot think of being
without your tobacco."11 As emotions heightened in May 1861,
many tobacconists in the Confederacy feared that their
valuable tobacco shipments might not be safe in Northern
ports as their cargo awaited transport to Europe and
beyond.12 On 3 May, a Baltimore merchant assuaged one
Richmond manufacturer's fears by stating that "as to the
safety of your property here you may feel perfectly at ease
and that also we will be able to ship them safely out of
this port (Baltimore), . . . now since your ports are
blockaded."13 Prior to the complete enforcement of the
Federal blockade, Baltimore was used regularly as an outlet
for southern tobacco which was shipped to Europe and
Australia.

Jacob Heald and Company and the Brothers

Boninger were two Baltimore firms who handled the
10Mailler, Lord, and Quereau to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 27 April 1861, ibid.
"Greene, Heath, and Allen to James Thomas, Jr. , San
Francisco, 30 April 1861, ibid.
12Mercer and Antello and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Philadelphia, 1 May 1861, ibid.
"Brothers Boninger to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 3
May 1861, ibid.
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exportation of tobacco overseas for James Thomas, Jr..
Tobacco which originated in Richmond was generally shipped
out of Baltimore upon ships of foreign registry.

This

outlet faded in use as it became increasingly difficult to
ship tobacco from Richmond to Baltimore.

Once the Federal

naval blockade was in place, Baltimore ceased to be an
outlet for outgoing Confederate tobacco.
Confederate tobacco manufacturers tried desperately
to maintain their trade with foreign markets for obvious
reasons.

In 1859, France and her colonies imported

43,661,635 pounds of American tobacco; the treasury of
France gained $36,000,000 in revenue which resulted from
importation duties placed on this tobacco.14 British
consumption of American tobacco for 1858, 1859, and 1860
was, respectively, 33,739,133 pounds, 34,459,864 pounds, and
35,306,846 pounds.

In 1860, the British duty on tobacco

imported from the U.S. was $.75 per pound of leaf tobacco
and $2.25 per pound of manufactured tobacco.15 In 1860,
Britain continued to levy a heavy duty on imported American
tobacco.

During the year it gained £35,000,000— one eighth

of the entire revenue brought in by Britain in 1860.

France

(not including its colonies) gained $25,000,000 from duties
placed on American tobacco in 1860, about one-half of all it
14DeBow's Magazine 31 (1861): 334.
I5Ibid., 335.
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obtained from duties annually.16 The tobacco trade
constituted the South's second-most valuable market in 1860;
only the economic value of cotton ($161,000,000) exceeded
that of tobacco ($14, 612,442) .17
The full implementation of the Federal blockade in
May 1861 had a constrictive effect upon the ability of
Confederate tobacconists to ship their valuable cargo
overseas to Europe and Australia.

A Rotterdam tobacco firm

expressed its concern regarding the disruption of the
tobacco trade due to the naval blockade by saying that "it
is very difficult to form a correct opinion of the future of
the article, everything depending upon turns things may take
on your side."18 As the Federals tightened their grip upon
Confederate ports, tobacconists in Australia complained
about the uncertainty and unreliability of written messages
from Melbourne, Sydney, and Adelaide reaching the Southern
capital in Richmond.19 The "political troubles" which
plagued tobacco interests in the Confederacy were described
by H.H. Meier and Co., a German tobacco house:

"It is

difficult to say what the course will be, our market is
I6Ibid., 204-5.
17U.S. Census, 1860.

See also Appendix 13 on page 130.

18Mees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr. , Rotterdam, 15
May 1861, Thomas Papers.
19Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr. , Melbourne, 24 May
1861, ibid.
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going to take in reference to prices of tobacco . . ."20.
The prospects of Virginia tobacconists were also lessened by
the influx of tobacco from Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri,
and Ohio into European markets.

The tobacco from these

territories within or near Union strongholds was quickly
supplanting Virginia tobacco which was more expensive and
more difficult to acquire.21
British tobacco houses such as Robert Edwards of
Liverpool and John K. Gilliat of London expressed their
lament at the scarcity of Virginia tobacco reaching their
ports:

"For the present we see that our business operations

with your country may become very limited and that this
season we are likely to get little or no tobacco."22

In late

May 1861, the house of Gilliat observed that "all shipments
now can only be made at great risk . . . as we can hold out
no hope of any interference on the part of the British
government which has declared its intentions of maintaining
a strict neutrality."23
Following the full implementation of the Federal
blockade on 3 0 April 1861, "all vessels passing the Capes of
20H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 15
May 1861, ibid.
21Ibid.
“John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
29 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
“Ibid.
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Virginia will be warned off, and those passing Fortress
Monroe will be required to anchor under the guns of the
fort, and subject themselves to an examination."24 Vessels
encountering the blockade the first time within fifteen days
of the blockade's establishment (before 16 May) were warned
and allowed to proceed.

Vessels that were stopped by the

blockade squadron after that date were subject to
confiscation as a prize of war.25
Tobacco which was actually seized by the blockading
squadron en route from Virginia to the British Isles caused
major concerns to parties on both sides of the ocean.
Confederate manufacturers lost their valuable tobacco to
Union authorities as a prize of war; European speculators
lost money and opportunity in a major way, also.

Two

vessels laden with Confederate tobacco and bound for Britain
fell prey to the blockade at this time.

On 20 May the

British barque Hiawatha was seized in Hampton Roads; shortly
thereafter, on 21 May, the British schooner Tropic Wind was
also seized as a prize of war.

They carried 445 tons and 63

tons respectively.26
In the Hiawatha incident, Robert Edwards, a British
tobacconist placed a claim for the seized contraband in a
24Bernard, 231.
“ibid., 235-36.
“Bernard, 233.
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Federal court of admiralty.

His tobacco house in Liverpool

complained to James Thomas, Jr., in Richmond that:
I have taken legal advice about obtaining your
tobacco, and find I cannot do so without rendering
myself liable to an action for perjury in case it
goes to trial, as I must swear before the U.S.
consul as well as a magistrate that the tobacco is
bonafide my own property.27
The seizure of Confederate tobacco and the ensuing
legal and financial repercussions did little to discourage
the blockade-running spirit of Southern tobacconists and
their British customers.

As the magnitude of war escalated

and the efficiency of the blockade improved, less tobacco
reached the shores of Britain during the summer of 1861.28 A
prominent London tobacco house, G.F. Davis and Sons,
captured the feeling of uncertainty which pervaded the
Confederate tobacco trade by stating:
In no trade have the effects of the American Civil
War upon the English market been more clearly
defined than in the tobacco trade. Since the
commencement of the conflict between the northern
and southern states, the trade of this country in
tobacco has undergone a complete revolution. The
quantity of American growth of that article now used
in the United Kingdom is not much more than one-half
what it was two years ago, and it is gradually
decreasing; indeed it is extremely problematical if
the American consumption in this country will ever
reach its former amount, for the growth of other
countries is now so freely used that it threatens to
^Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 21
June 1861, Thomas Papers.
28C.R. Somervail to James Thomas, Jr., London, 21 June
1861, ibid.
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supersede the American growth altogether.29
Less than 17,000,000 pounds of Confederate tobacco reached
Great Britain in 1861, compared to nearly 35,000,000 pounds
in 1860.
Prices for the scarce Virginia article continued to
rise in Great Britain, and upon the European continent as
well.

At this time, in a letter to James Thomas, Jr.,

Robert Edwards quoted the price of good Virginia tobacco to
be between £9 and £12 per five hundred pounds.30 A Bremen
tobacco firm encouraged a Confederate house to continue to
ship tobacco through the blockade, despite the enormous
risks, "Should things with you continue as heretofore, we
may of course see prices with us advance further.

On the

other hand, it needs but the rumour of a reopening of
Southern ports to cause a total stand in sales at the
present value."31 One clever ploy used by Confederate
blockade runners carrying tobacco was to employ vessels not
only flying the British flag, but also, using ships which
were registered to legitimate British companies.32

Tobacco

29U.S. Congress, Senate, Letter of the Commissioner of
Agriculture, 38th Cong., 1st sess., 1864, 13.
30John K. Gilliat to James Thomas, Jr., Liverpool, 7
September 1861, Thomas Papers.
31D.H. Watjen to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 31 August
1861, ibid.
32Dudley Nichols to James Thomas, Jr. , Savannah, 21
October 1861, ibid.
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which was manufactured in Richmond would frequently be
shipped south by rail upon the Petersburg and Weldon or the
Richmond and Danville railroads.

This tobacco eventually

made its way to Confederate blockade runners in Wilmington,
Savannah, or Charleston.

Confederate tobacco runners were

always on the lookout for a daring captain who had "never
been spoken to at sea since running the blockade while
escaping Old Abe's clutches."33
In the fall of 1861, Confederate tobacconists
continued to dare the blockade in an attempt to keep their
contacts with the European tobacco market alive.

Australian

firms such as Fisher, Ricards and Company and Francis
McPherson continued to import Confederate tobacco into the
port of Melbourne.

Financial arrangements between

Australian firms and Virginia manufacturers were generally
mediated by the London house of Gilliat.34 Money belonging
to Confederate manufacturers remained in the protective
hands of British banks such as the First Exchange of London
and the Chartered Bank of Australia.35 By the year's end,
however, tobacco of high quality could no longer be shipped
out of New Orleans upon fast steamers to Havana.

Prior to

33Ibid.
^J.K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London, 19
September 1861, Thomas Papers.
35Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 26
September 1861, ibid.
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the fall of New Orleans, quantities of coffee and other
provisions could be acquired for importation into the
luxury-starved Confederacy.
As the war entered into its second year, Confederate
tobacconists continued to export their valuable tobacco crop
through the Federal gauntlet.

Southern tobacco continued to

reach customers in London, Liverpool, Amsterdam, Rotterdam,
Bremen, Antwerp, Melbourne, and Sydney.

Confederate

tobacconists gained the patronage of a new European customer
in January 1862.

The Italian Regie, the official tobacco

company for that country, entered into the Virginia tobacco
market through a Confederate intermediary, D.H. Watjen and
Company of Bremen, Germany.36
Although statistical data is limited, documentation
from the United States 38th Congress demonstrates that the
Federal government exported an extraordinary amount of
tobacco to Europe at the beginning of the war.

Great

Britain imported 2,847,130 pounds of tobacco from northern
states in 1861 alone.

The North exported 152,562,200 pounds

and 144,303,400 pounds in 1861-62 and 1862-63 respectively.
This tobacco translated into an economic bonanza for the
Federal government:

$13,394,086 for 1861-62 and $23,149,777

36D.H. Watjen and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3 0
January 1862, ibid.
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for 1862-63.37 Overall tobacco production for the United
States in 1862 and 1863 was 208,000,000 pounds and
258,000,000 pounds respectively.38
The Italian Regie operated much in the same way as
its monopolistic counterpart in France; although smaller in
scale the Italian Regie mirrored the French Regie in terms
of purpose, function, and value.

Each served as the tobacco

monopoly for their respective governments.

The French Regie

was "inextricably interwoven within France's revenue system
and closely intertwined in important agricultural
interests."39 The French Regie generated revenue for the
nation's treasury by placing duties on all imported tobacco.
"These taxes were not restrictions but were revenue
measures, the most important in France except for those on
salt."40
In 1830, the French Regie contributed
about six percent of the revenues received by the
French government. Tobacco factories employed some
16,000 laborers in ten factories and twenty
entrepots. The flow of tobacco through these
factories and through 350 wholesale and 30,000
retail outlets was supervised by some 13,000
officials. The capitalization of the French regie
at this time was estimated at 200,000,000 francs and
37U .S . Congress, Senate, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., Misc.
Doc. No. 13, 21 January 1864.
38Ibid.
39Duncan, 293.
40Ibid.
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its annual profits at

nearly

450%.41

In 1860, the FrenchRegie employed over 30,000

people

who were involved in tobacco manufacture, sales, and
administration.42 The tobacco monopoly of France "was at
once a foundation sill of

French

fiscal policy and

abar to

the development of a free

market

for American(and later,

Confederate) tobacco in France."43
The British government had a stringent policy in
regard to tobacco importation.

Once it entered the country,

all imported raw and manufactured tobacco had to be
transported to official warehouses of the Customs
Commission.

The imported tobacco was weighed, prized, and

then assessed to determine the duties (importation taxes)
which were to be placed on the article.

The penalty for

failing to follow this procedure resulted in a forfeiture of
the tobacco and a fine of twenty pounds sterling.

These

heavy restrictions discouraged the smuggling of tobacco into
Britain, and guaranteed the Crown a steady flow of revenue.44
The British carefully documented all proceedings which arose
as a result of the seizure of illegally imported tobacco.
Regular reports recorded the nature of the judicial
41Ibid., 283.
*2DeBow's Magazine 31 (1861): 334.
43Duncan, 300.
York:

^Edgar L. Erickson, ed., British Sessions Papers (New
Readex Microprint, 1966), 16 February 1863, 187-93.
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proceedings which were involved in each case, the fine or
sentence which was levied, and the resolution of the tobacco
which was seized.45 These restrictions raised the price of
Confederate tobacco to exorbitant levels and forced tobacco
consumers in Britain to seek alternative sources.
British importers sometimes complained that
substantial portions of tobacco were arriving in damaged
condition.

Tobacco which was shipped overseas in hogsheads

(a barrel which weighed anywhere from 1,400 to 1,600 pounds
when entirely packed with tobacco) frequently arrived at its
destination in a less than optimum state.

Mold, heat, and

deterioration all contributed to the devaluation of the
article.46 The physical decomposition of Virginia tobacco
during shipment was only one of several problems which
troubled Confederate tobacconists during the war.
Correspondence between tobacco firms in the
Confederacy and clients overseas became increasingly more
difficult as the war dragged on in late 1862.

The

Australian firm Lord and Co. justified its lack of
correspondence to a Confederate manufacturer at this time by
saying that "we have not written you for some time as there
was no way we could feel certain the letter would reach
45Ibid., House of Commons, vol. 53, 7 March 1864, 72329.
^John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr.,
Liverpool, 8 March 1862, Thomas Papers.
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you.”47

Foreign tobacco firms complained that "all our

letters have for a long time been returned to us";48
communications difficulties also accentuated the economic
hardships that foreign tobacco houses experienced during the
war.

One Australian firm spoke for all foreign consumers of

Confederate tobacco by stating that "we hope ere long to see
your handwriting again and trust that the troubles of your
country will soon be settled, and that the way may be clear
for your shipments and that we may soon be favored with
further consignments from you."49 A Bremen concern echoed
these statements in its correspondence with a Richmond firm
by saying that it was "hoping that peace may soon be
restored and we may have often hereafter the pleasure of
corresponding with you."50
As 1862 drew to a close, the foreign demand for
Virginia tobacco subsided as foreign tobacco began to
supplant Virginia leaf.

High prices reduced the demand for

Confederate tobacco in Europe as the blockade gradually
reduced the exodus of Confederate tobacco into foreign
47Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 24 May
1862, ibid.
48Lord and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Melbourne, 25
September 1862, ibid.
49Ibid.
50F.M. Victor and Sons to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 10
October 1862, Thomas Papers.
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ports.51 These factors caused one tobacco house in Rotterdam
to remark that
tobacco in general remains quiet and buyers take
reluctantly what they want for immediate consumption
only. We sincerely hope that the political troubles
on your side may be soon settled and that we may
then resume our correspondence to mutual advantage.52
By 1863, the unfortunate reality for Confederate and
European tobacconists alike was that the Federal naval
blockade would never again allow a "normal” resumption of
tobacco trade between Confederate manufacturers and foreign
tobacco houses.

Europeans began using tobacco substitutes

for the highly valued Confederate leaf.

Tobacco from

Holland, Java, Greece, Turkey, Paraguay, and Egypt was far
more available to consumers in Europe, and was, of course,
much less costly.53
In the spring of 1863, some European tobacco houses
closed their accounts with Confederate manufacturers
altogether, rather than continue to absorb wartime losses.54
Dutch and German firms such as Mees and Moens, H.H. Meier,
and F.M. Victor and Sons settled their tobacco accounts with
5iF.M. Victor and Sons to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 25
October 1862, ibid.
52Mees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr., Rotterdam, 23
December 1862, ibid.
53John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
10 January 1863, ibid.
MMees and Moens to James Thomas, Jr., Rotterdam, 20
February 1863, ibid.
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James Thomas, Jr. in mid-1863.

Continental demand for

southern tobacco was virtually nonexistent due to the
availability of foreign substitutes.

As military and

economic conditions in the South worsened, many Confederate
tobacconists found themselves wishing that they had been
more meticulous in their prewar financial planning; nearly
all Southern tobacco manufacturers, agents, planters, and
exporters felt the heavy weight of the Civil War upon their
trade with Europe as the year progressed.55 The European
demand for Virginia tobacco gradually decreased in 1863 as
the article became increasingly more expensive and more
difficult to obtain.

"An increase in the consumption of

[tobacco] substitutes and liberal supplies from New York"56
each continued to exacerbate the Confederacy's rapidly
weakening tobacco trade.
The relentless pressure which the naval blockade
exerted upon the Confederate economy had an overwhelmingly
stifling effect upon the South's ability to maintain any
semblance of trade with its tobacco markets in Europe and
Australia.

Lincoln's naval blockade virtually ended the

Confederate international tobacco trade by the close of
1863.

Adding to the troubles of the Confederacy's foreign

55John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
28 April 1863, ibid.
56H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 3
July 1863, ibid.
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tobacco trade was competition from other tobacco-producing
nations.

European and Australian consumers relied upon

cheaper and more accessible sources of the weed as less
Confederate tobacco reached the continent.

Foreign

countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and the United
States furnished Europe with the quantities of tobacco it
desired at a price it was willing to pay.

By employing the

naval blockade, the Federal government used the economic
tenet of supply and demand to its advantage.

Confederate

tobacco was prevented from reaching the shores of Europe.
As quantities of the article became scarce on the European
market, prices soared out of reach of the consumer.

The

void left by the absence of Confederate tobacco was filled
by tobacco substitutes which were both affordable and
obtainable.

The failure of the Confederate foreign tobacco

trade was inexorably connected to the Confederacy's
difficulties in diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 4

CONFEDERATE TOBACCO AND FOREIGN DIPLOMACY
Diplomatically, tobacco was a matter of interest and
concern to the Confederacy in one primary area.

Tobacco (as

well as cotton, of course) was used as a bargaining chip by
the Confederate States of America in its effort to gain
independent status and official political recognition from
two of the world's greatest economic and military powers:
Great Britain and France.

An editorial published by the New

York Times at this time underscored the potential diplomatic
value that tobacco could provide to Confederate interests in
foreign policy.

The Times suggested:

It may not be out of season to inquire how far the
fate of the world is based on smoke, in other words,
what is likely to be the effect of the blockade on
the tobacco supply of the European markets? Tobacco
is probably, after salt, the object whose
consumption is most generally diffused. The
generous tobacco is the gentleman's saint and
soldier's idol.1
The editorial reported that the United States supplied Great
Britain with one half of its annual tobacco consumption of
60,000,000 pounds; the Times also stated that the United
States furnished between three-fourths to four-fifths of the
lNew York Times, 2 October 1861.
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tobacco annually consumed in France.2
Both Great Britain and France contemplated the merits
of recognizing Confederate independence in light of their
dependence on Southern tobacco and cotton.3 Confederate
diplomats hoped that each power might resort to acts of war
in order to break the Federal blockade and to preserve their
reliable supply of revenue which resulted from the
importation of Confederate tobacco.4 Tobacco was an
instrument of Confederate foreign diplomacy with Britain and
France in several instances during the Civil War.

Each

political crisis could have potentially brought Britain or
France into a political and military alliance with the
Confederacy.

"King Tobacco" diplomacy inevitably failed in

each of the following cases:
•

the Hiawatha and Tropic Wind incidents;

•

the Trent affair;

•

the Franco-Confederate attempt to ship Frenchowned tobacco to France through the blockade.

In March 1861 Confederate emissaries William Yancey,
Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann traveled to Europe on
behalf of the fledgling government of the C.S.A. to
2Ibid. Please refer to chapter 3 for statistics
describing British and French tobacco consumption,
importation, and taxation.
3New York Times, 26 January 1861.
4Debow's Magazine 31 (1861): 204-5.
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negotiate direct trade agreements with Great Britain and
France.

Confederate diplomats discovered that many European

tobacconists were in regular communication with their
respective governments in regard to tobacco policy.5
Foreign governments realized that a plentiful and highquality grade of Confederate tobacco would be among the many
Southern agricultural crops which could be exchanged for
manufactured goods (exceeding 150 million dollars in 1861)
which were formerly purchased by the South from Northern
concerns.6 Government commissioners who presided over the
British and French tobacco industries seriously considered
the idea of breaking the blockade of Confederate ports as a
means of re-opening channels of trade with Confederate
tobacco manufacturers.7
Because blockade running was the only viable
transportational option that Confederate businessmen had in
exporting tobacco and cotton overseas to European customers,
some Southern tobacco manufacturers attempted to receive the
sJohn K. Gilliat and Co., W.E. and H.O. Wills, G.F.
Davis and Sons, Grant, Hodgson and Co., R.S. Maitland and
Co. of London, and Robert Kerr and Son, W.A. and G. Maxwell,
Robert Edwards, and William Somervail and Son of Liverpool
were among the leading British tobacco firms during the
American Civil War. The House of Rothschild was the major
private tobacco concern of France. The French and Italian
Regie were the official tobacco monopolies of these states,
respectively. Major Dutch, German, and Australian tobacco
houses are listed in Appendix 3, page 117.
6New York Times, 19 March 1861.
7Ibid., 7 November 1861.
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permission of the Federal government to allow Northern or
foreign vessels free passage through the blockade to
Southern ports.

Unfortunately, Confederate tobacconists

learned that "no vessel— foreign or otherwise, can get
clearance for any Southern port and a strict blockade is
enforced at the mouth of the James River."8 The Federal
blockade received the close scrutiny of both Great Britain
and France.

The complex legal provisions of international

law strictly governed how belligerents and neutrals were to
conduct themselves in maritime affairs during a time of
blockade or war.
Southern tobacco merchants were forced to hurdle a
myriad of bureaucratic obstacles in the form of Federal
prize courts and courts of admiralty as the legal provisions
of the blockade were enforced.

The legal representatives of

Confederate tobacco houses faced a mountain of litigation in
the process of getting confiscated vessels and cargo
released.

In early May 1861, one Confederate advisor, Jacob

Heald of Baltimore, reported to Richmond tobacconist James
Thomas, Jr.:
The writer has just got back from Washington and
after two days of very unpleasant and troublesome
labor succeeded in getting released the three
schooners now at the navy yard in Philadelphia.
In
conversation with Mr. Seward (Secretary of State)
and Mr. Welles (Secretary of Navy), the writer was
given to understand that a claim for damages of
8Fisher, Ricards and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 4 May 1861, Thomas Papers.
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either vessels or cargo would not be entertained by
government-^that in these wartimes the innocent must
bear their part and it was not within the reach of
their departments to make any distinction in the
discharge of a strict duty-^that we ought to be glad
to have our property released. We . . . will engage
the service of a good maritime lawyer for the
purpose of preparing the necessary papers with which
to go before a court of claims.9
Many Confederate victims of the blockade learned that "the
Courts of Admiralty in charge required before relief the
affidavits of the owner of the vessel and representatives of
the cargo, that no claim or claims would be preferred
against the U.S. government based upon their seizure or
detention.1110
The Federal seizure of the British ships, the
Hiawatha and the Tropic Wind in May, and the Trent in
November 1861, created shock waves within the political
circles of the Confederate States, Great Britain, France,
and the United States.

All three vessels, seized without

warning by Federal warships, were of British registry and
flew the flag of Great Britain.

The Hiawatha incident

tested the international integrity of the Federal blockade
for the first time.

This case was meticulously studied by

both belligerents and neutrals alike.
The barque Hiawatha was filled to near capacity with
9Jacob Heald to James Thomas, Jr., Baltimore, 23 May
1861, ibid.
10Jacob Heald to James Thomas, Jr. , Baltimore, 30 May
1861, ibid.
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445 tons of tobacco which was exported from the Confederacy
through the port of Richmond and was en route to London when
captured in Hampton Roads on 20 May 1861 by the American
steamer, the Star.n

The prestigious tobacco house of

London, John K. Gilliat and Company, was due to receive the
tobacco cargo of the Hiawatha.

Gilliat described the

Hiawatha incident in the following manner to James Thomas,
Jr., who owned a substantial portion of the cargo:
We are informed that the Hiawatha has been taken by
the blockading squadron and sent round to New York
as a prize. We cannot suppose she will be condemned
if we understand the question right; a British ship
sailed before the expiration of the time allowed
neutrals to depart— we think the flag will cover the
property [tobacco]. We shall do all that can be
done for our [Confederate] friends. We are bringing
in parliamentary influence . . . as we cannot
suppose that any nation is desirous to predicate
difficulties with this country on questions of
maritime law.12
Testimony from Confederate and British parties
involved in the Federal trial on the Hiawatha incident
maintained that the barque and her crew were well within
their right to sail freely through the Federal blockade from
Richmond on 16 May 1861.

The Hiawatha was unable to depart

from Richmond's deep water port of City Point until 18 May
for want of a steam-tug.

The Federal government had only

established an effective blockade on 1 May 1861; Confederate
11London Times, 28 October 1861.
12John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
8 June 1861, Thomas Papers.
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officials contested the Federal confiscation of the Hiawatha
by citing the following Federal proclamation:
Neutral vessels will be allowed fifteen days to
leave port after the actual commencement of the
blockade, whether such vessels are with or without
cargoes, and whether the cargoes were shipped before
or after the commencement of the blockade. 3
The Confederacy maintained that the Hiawatha was within her
right to pass through the blockade unmolested.

The case

concerning the Hiawatha and her full cargo of tobacco came
to court in late July of 1861; the solicitor and attorney
who acted on behalf of the English consul in the case stated
prior to the hearing that he "feared the judgment will go
against him."14 Immediately before the decision was made
upon the Hiawatha and her cargo, John K. Gilliat cryptically
remarked "should the judgment be adverse, an appeal ought
unquestionably to be made to the Supreme Court, although
under the existing state of things we should feel no
security that justice would be even there administered."15
On 30 September 1861, the Hiawatha and her cargo were
condemned by a Federal District Court in New York, by a
Judge Betts.

Robert Edwards, a powerful tobacco house in

Liverpool, predicted that the case would be carried into the
13London Times, 28 October 1861.
14Fisher, Ricards and Company to James Thomas, Jr., New
York, 20 July 1861, Thomas Papers.
15John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
31 August 1861, ibid.
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Supreme Court.16 Indeed, the higher court later reversed the
decision upon the Hiawatha and her cargo of tobacco; in a
communication to Richmond in late 1861, John K. Gilliat
surmised that this decision was overturned as a result of a
major tenet of international law-the principle of free ships
and free trade.17
Actually, the Supreme Court overturned the original
condemnation of the barque Hiawatha for two principal
reasons.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the use of a naval

blockade was recognized by international law as the right of
a belligerent nation at war.

The high court ruled that "the

Federal Courts could not recognize the existence of a public
or civil war carrying with it belligerent rights until it
had been recognized by Congress.

A state of civil war was

only recognized for the first time by an Act of Congress, 13
July 1861.1118 As a result, the Supreme Court ordered that
all ships captured as prizes of war prior to this date be
released by the Federal government.

The second legal tenet

which contributed to the release of the Hiawatha was the
observation that the British captain of the ship had
complied with the Federal decree of leaving within fifteen
16Robert Edwards to James Thomas, Jr. , Liverpool, 11
October 1861, ibid.; New York Times, 1 October 1861.
17John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., London,
18 October 1861, Thomas Papers.
18Bernard, 90-91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

days of the effective implementation of the blockade.

The

court ruled that British officers aboard the Hiawatha had
acted in good faith in observing the Federal deadline for
the departure of neutrals, and that their delay was due to
no fault of their own.19
The first of these two interpretations of
international law handed down by the Federal Supreme Court
applied to the case of the Tropic Wind.

The sixty-three ton

British schooner was laden with tobacco which was owned by
James Thomas, Jr., and was seized by the Federal squadron in
Hampton Roads the day after the Hiawatha was seized, on 21
May 1861.

Citing the ruling on the seizure and release of

the Hiawatha, the District Court of the United States for
the District of Columbia ordered the release of the Tropic
Wind and her cargo.20 The Tropic Wind proceeded on its way
from Washington to Halifax, Nova Scotia in October 1861,
where the tobacco cargo was shipped to London.21
Although the Trent affair did not directly involve a
cargo of Confederate tobacco, this volatile political crisis
of late 1861 did have a profound impact upon the value and
demand for Confederate tobacco in European markets.

As news

spread across Europe of the Federal seizure of the Trent,
19Ibid., 235-36.
20Ibid. , 97-98.
21J.M. Carlisle to James Thomas, Jr., Washington, D.C.,
22 June 1861, Thomas Papers.
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H.H. Meier and Company, a major tobacco house in Bremen,
Germany remarked that
the seizure of the commissioners Mason and Slidell
has caused a very great sensation in Europe. We
doubt whether peace will be concluded before next
spring and consider therefore the present calmness
in the tobacco market as unfounded and transitory.22
As war between the United States and Great Britain became an
immediate possibility, a Confederate tobacconist in New
Orleans gleefully predicted that
should a war break out between the Yankees and Great
Britain, there is no doubt but some of our ports
would soon be opened and this one about the first as
Norfolk would still be blockaded by the forts and
Savannah and Charleston by the fleets rendezvousing
at Port Royal and Hatter as.23
The tobacco traders of Europe secretly hoped for a
peaceful solution to the Trent affair.

One German

tobacconist observed that "since France has adopted the
English view of the Trent affair, people are inclined to
think that the government at Washington will give
satisfaction; hence the increased confidence in peace."24
European speculators in the Confederate tobacco trade hoped
for a peaceful resolution to the crisis because this would
prolong the Federal blockade, and therefore make it more
22H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., Bremen, 28
November 1861, ibid.
23Van Benthuysen and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., New
Orleans, 30 December 1861, ibid.
24H.H. Meier and Co. to James Thomas, Jr., 30 December
1861, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77

difficult for Confederate tobacco to leave Southern ports.
When news reached Europe in January 1862 that the crisis had
been peacefully resolved by the governments of Great Britain
and the United States, European tobacco houses across the
continent rejoiced at the prospect of a limited but steady
supply of Confederate tobacco reaching their ports.

No

longer would they have to fear a massive influx of
Confederate tobacco which would drive prices to exorbitant
levels.25
The final and most important diplomatic story
involving tobacco during the Civil War developed in the
spring of 1862.

The principal players in this drama were

Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State; John
Slidell, Confederate Commissioner in Paris; Alfred Paul,
French consul in Richmond; Henri Mercier, French minister in
Washington; Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys, French foreign
minister; William H. Seward, American Secretary of State;
and William L. Dayton, American minister in Paris.

The

particular issue raised by these diplomats involved two
quantities of tobacco which were bought and paid for in late
March and early April 1861.

Alfred Paul, acting as an agent

for the French Regie, purchased 7,000 hogsheads (about
10,500,000 pounds) of tobacco, and the New York firm of
August Belmont had purchased 2,200 hogsheads (about
25John K. Gilliat and Co. to James Thomas, Jr. ,
Liverpool, 11 January 1862, ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

3,300,000 pounds) for the Paris branch of the Rothschilds.26
The episode began only as
a complicated commercial operation, but developed
into a doubled-edged diplomatic weapon: the South
used it to test the Federal blockade, and the North
used it to counter the early French policy towards
Confederate naval activities in France. It involved
two informal understandings between Great Britain
and France and an informal convention between the
United States and France.27
The French Foreign Minister assigned to Washington,
Baron Henri Mercier and Alfred Paul, Consul of France
assigned to Richmond, were both active in negotiating with
Confederate and Federal authorities as a means of securing
the tobacco and bringing it through the blockade.

In April

1862, Mercier arrived in Norfolk, and officially began
French efforts to gain control of the Rothschild tobacco
sequestered in Confederate warehouses in Richmond.28 Alfred
Paul was instructed by Mercier to make arrangements to have
the Rothschild tobacco transferred to the warehouse which
stored the Regie tobacco.

The French government wanted the

tobacco of the Rothschilds and the Regie stored together as
26Lynn M. Case and Warren F. Spencer, The United States
and France: Civil War Diplomacy (Philadelphia:
The
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 526-27. Warren F.
Spencer's article, "French Tobacco in Richmond during the
Civil War," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography
71 (April 1963): 185-202, is included in this volume and is
an outstanding detailed examination of this tobacco-related
controversy.
27Case and Spencer, 526.
28Nev York Times, 18 April 1862.
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neutral property in warehouses protected under the French
flag of neutrality.

The French feared that the Confederate

government might confiscate the Rothschild tobacco as
private property.

When Confederate authorities in Richmond

attempted to seize the Rothschild tobacco in May 1862,
French consul Paul took the matter to the Confederate States
District Court.

The court decided in favor of the

Rothschilds, and allowed Paul to store all of the tobacco
together as protected neutral property.29
The focus of these developments shifted briefly
across the Atlantic to Paris following the Confederate
decision on the Rothschild tobacco.

John Slidell, the

Confederate commissioner assigned to Paris, was very much
aware of the potential leverage that tobacco could exert
upon the cause of bringing about official French recognition
of the C.S.A.

Slidell's communication with the

Confederacy's first Secretary of State R.M.T. Hunter in July
1862 formally requested that the Rothschild and Regie
tobacco be removed from Richmond and shipped through the
blockade to Paris.30 The Confederate commissioner wrote a
lengthy letter to French Foreign Minister Edouard Thovenal
one week later.

What he outlined was the tantalizing

29Case and Spencer, 527; also Spencer, 187-88.
30Slidell to Hunter, Paris, 14 July 1862, State
Department Papers, Confederate States of America, Division
of Manuscripts, MSS, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
(hereafter cited as Pickett Papers).
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economic bounty of Confederate tobacco, cotton, rice, and
sugar that could be had as a benefit of French recognition
of the independence of the Confederacy.31 The Confederate
tobacco shortage did not escape the attention of Emperor
Louis Napoleon.

Several of the emperor's closest advisors

feared that the loyalty and morale of France's 600,000
soldiers would weaken if tobacco rations continued to
dwindle.

Based on a monthly tobacco ration of three-fourths

of a pound per soldier, the French army consumed 5,400,000
pounds of tobacco annually.

As a result, the Regie made the

acquisition of Confederate tobacco a matter of top priority
and political expediency.32
In January 1862, the recently-appointed French
foreign minister Edouard Drouyn de Lhuys instructed Alfred
Paul to secure permission to send the French tobacco to
France.

Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin granted

permission provided that the tobacco was shipped through
City Point on the James.

American Secretary of State Seward

granted the French permission to move the tobacco through
the blockade, provided that it was shipped out of Savannah,
Georgia.33 With the Confederate and the American governments
at a philosophical impasse on this issue, Mercier presented
31Slidell to Thovenal, Paris, 21 July 1862, ibid.
32New York Times, 2 October 1861.
33Case and Spencer, 527.
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Seward with an alternative; Mercier "suggested that the
United States could buy French goodwill if they allowed the
tobacco to leave from the James River, through the Hampton
Roads blockade."34 In July 1862, Seward agreed to Mercier's
proposal only if specific approval was obtained from Great
Britain in moving the tobacco through the blockade.35
Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin also agreed to allow
the French tobacco to pass through Confederate territory
provided that the French vessels transporting the tobacco
did not stop at any point along the way that was held by the
enemy.

Benjamin believed that Federal approval allowing

safe passage to the French tobacco tacitly implied "an
absolute abandonment of the blockade to the world at
large."36
United States minister to France, William L. Dayton,
lobbied heavily for a relaxation of the blockade in order to
allow the French tobacco to reach the Emperor.

In this way,

the Federal State Department hoped to beat the Confederacy
to the diplomatic punch by winning the favor of tobaccostarved France.37 Also, the Federal government hoped that
^Ibid.
35Ibid. , 528-29.
36Ibid.
37Dayton to Seward, Paris, 21 October 1863, U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1861-1957),
II, 724.
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the goodwill gesture might discourage the likelihood of
France sponsoring the construction or re-arming of
Confederate warships in French ports.

Federal efforts to

win the approval of the French emperor were not in vain.
French ministers Mercier and Drouyn de Lhuys each thanked
Federal Secretary of State Seward for his cooperation and
assistance in allowing for a relaxation of the blockade to
accommodate the shipment of the Regie tobacco from Richmond
to France.38
This diplomatic cooperation was short-lived.

In

September 1863, Seward received a disturbing message from
Dayton.

The Confederate cruiser Florida had recently sailed

into the French port of Brest.

To make matters worse,

Dayton reported to Seward that he had convincing proof that
Confederate ironclads were being constructed in Bordeaux and
Nantes.

Seward immediately withdrew Federal permission to

move the tobacco through the blockade upon hearing this
news.39 When word of this decision reached French Foreign
Minister Drouyn de Lhuys, he immediately suspended French
permission to arm the Confederate ships at Bordeaux and
Nantes.

"Seward obviously felt that his action on the

tobacco affected the decision to withhold armaments from the
38Dayton to Seward, Paris, 25 December 1863, FRUS
(1863), no. 390, 11.
39Case and Spencer, 530-31.
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Confederate vessels under construction."40
On 23 November 1863, Seward and Mercier drew up an
"Informal Convention under which the exportation of certain
tobacco from within limits under blockade shall be
governed."41

This convention between France and the United

States was valid for five months (until 23 April 1864) and
was the governing document for the remainder of this complex
ordeal.

The French government ordered Consul Alfred Paul to

make the necessary arrangements to hire neutral ships for
the passage of the French tobacco.

Logistical problems and

contradictory communications between Paris and Washington
prevented Paul from beginning transportational arrangements
until April 1864.

Paul sailed up the James with an escort

of the French corvettes, the Tisaphone and the Grenada, who
accompanied the two British freighters that were to carry
the tobacco, the Bidwell and the Miller.42
The neutral convoy reached City Point safely on 21
April 1864.

After having only 150 hogsheads of tobacco

loaded, Paul was ordered by General Benjamin Butler to
return to Fort Monroe because the time limit for the tobacco
operations had expired.43 Prior to leaving, Paul visited
40Ibid., 532.
41Ibid., 532-33.
42Ibid. , 535-36.
43Ibid. , 537.
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Confederate Secretary of State Benjamin and advised him of
the present circumstances.

Benjamin was terribly upset upon

hearing the news of the Franco-American convention, and
reminded Paul that the agreement between the Confederacy and
France clearly stipulated that French tobacco could not
pause or stop in any territory held by the enemy once it
left City Point for the open sea.

The convention was

especially objectionable to Benjamin because “France
recognized the pretentions of the United States to a control
over neutral vessels and their crews while in Confederate
ports.',44
The failure of the French to acknowledge openly
Confederate sovereignty in order to gain their valuable
supply of tobacco was a bitter diplomatic embarrassment to
the South.

As a consequence of France's seeming shift in

policy, the C.S.A. "emphatically refused to permit the
exportation of French tobacco to a nation which appeared to
deny its independence."45 Benjamin declared that no French
vessel could be allowed to take on cargo in any Confederate
port until the convention was dissolved.

From a Confederate

standpoint, the fate of the French tobacco was sealed when
Secretary of State Benjamin officially rejected France's
“ Ibid., 539.
45Milledge L. Bonham, Jr., "The French Consuls in the
Confederate States," Studies in Southern History and
Politics. Inscribed to William Archibald Dunning (New York:
Kennikat Press, 1914), 92.
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request to export the tobacco in September 1864.

Benjamin

justified his decision by stating that the French had
"entered into a convention with our enemy so objectionable
in its character and so derogatory to our rights as an
independent power that we have been forced to withdraw
permission" to ship the French their tobacco.46
After these serious diplomatic setbacks in 1863 and
1864, Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon ordered
Colin J. McRae "to take charge of all Confederate securities
deposited with Fraser, Trenholm and Company, and to
distribute these funds to Confederate purchasing agents"47 in
London and Liverpool.

Fraser, Trenholm and Company was a

highly successful and widely respected firm involved in the
fields of banking, importation, and exportation.

By taking

over the responsibility of the Confederacy's securities with
Fraser, Trenholm and Company in Liverpool, McRae, in effect,
became the Confederacy's European Secretary of the Treasury.
In this capacity, McRae wrote Confederate Treasury Secretary
Christopher G. Memminger and suggested that the government
take control of all exports, and that the Confederacy
impress all cotton and tobacco in the South and use them to
“^Benjamin to Hotze, Richmond, 20 September 1864,
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the
War of the Rebellion, U.S. War Department (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 2nd ser., III, 1213.
47Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 143.
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finance the war effort.48
McRae won the support of Charles K. Prolieu, the
acting president of Fraser, Trenholm, and Company shortly
after arriving in Liverpool.

Prolieu agreed to finance the

construction of eight blockade runners for the Confederacy.
Four of these ships were constructed by Jones, Quiggin and
Company.
and Sons.

The remaining four ships were constructed by Laird
McRae also contracted with the renowned tobacco

and banking house of London and Liverpool, John K. Gilliat
and Company, for the construction of six additional blockade
runners by the firm of Jones, Quiggin and Company.
Financial arrangements between the Confederate government
and each of these British financiers were similar.

Each

house financed the construction of the blockade runners for
the Confederacy.

In return, these two firms would receive

the proceeds of one-half of the cotton and tobacco which was
brought through the blockade.

Once the loans were paid off,

the Confederacy would become the sole operator of the
vessels.

The Gilliat tobacco house paid for the

construction of the following sidewheelers:

the Rosine, the

Ruby, the Widgeon, the Curlew, the Snipe, and the Plover.
Jones, Quiggin and Company contracted to deliver
these vessels to Gilliat and Company by December 1864;
unfortunately for the Confederacy, these blockade runners
48Ibid. , 142-43.
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remained unfinished at the war's end.49
Confederate tobacco was simply not diplomatically
enticing enough to elicit official recognition from either
France or Great Britain.

The Confederacy's attempt at "King

Tobacco" diplomacy failed; neither France nor Great Britain
extended political recognition to the Confederate States of
America, and neither European power provided any military
assistance to the Confederates.

Conversely, neither Great

Britain nor France actually received the tobacco they
desired or felt entitled to during the war.

The Rothschild

tobacco, being private property, was eventually destroyed by
retreating Confederate soldiers during the evacuation of
Richmond on 2 April 1865.50 The 7,000 hogsheads of tobacco
owned by the French Regie were finally removed from Richmond
and shipped to Paris once the Union army had secured control
of Richmond and the James River after the war.51
49Ibid.; see also Charles S. Davis, Colin McRae:
Confederate Financial Agent (Tuscaloosa: Confederate
Publishing Company, Inc., 1961), 56-57.
50Case and Spencer, 542.
51Ibid., 544.
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CHAPTER 5

THE POSTBELLUM TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN THE SOUTH
Four years of war left the Confederacy in ruins;
Southern cities, factories, and plantations were scenes of
destruction.

The Confederate States of America was no more.

Its once-thriving tobacco industry had almost disappeared in
the wake of war.

The Southern tobacco industry would be

dormant until the end of Reconstruction.

Tobacco had been a

useful and powerful economic weapon during the war.
Tobacco, however, failed to attract the diplomatic and
economic attention from Europe that the Confederacy thought
it would.
The statistical figures cited by the agricultural
reports of the seventh, eighth, and ninth United States
Census document the rise and decline of the Southern tobacco
industry between 1850 and 1870.
In 1850, Virginia produced 56,803,227 pounds of the
nation's total production of 199,735,993 pounds of tobacco.
Roughly one quarter of the nation's tobacco was produced in
Virginia; it had a value of $5,157,652.

Between 1850 and

1860, individual manufacturers in Richmond, Lynchburg, and
Danville became more productive.

In 1850 there were twenty-

three manufacturers among the three cities who produced more
88
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than $50,000 worth of tobacco.

In 1860, forty-three

manufacturers produced this product value.
bumper crop of tobacco in 1860.

Virginia had a

It produced 123,968,312

pounds of the article worth $12,236,683.

The Old Dominion

produced over one-third of the nation's 434,183,561 pounds
of tobacco.

The statistics from the census of 1870 bear out

the devastating effect that the war had upon the tobacco
industry of Virginia.

Virginia's tobacco production of 1870

was 37,086,364 pounds, well below its production level of
1850.

Virginia produced less than ten percent of the

nation's 262,735,341 pounds of tobacco in 1870.

This

productivity yielded $7,054,770 of the nation's $71,762,044
total tobacco revenue, less than ten percent.
The same statistical trends apply to the four major
tobacco manufacturing cities of Virginia between 1850 and
1870.

Richmond, Danville, Petersburg, and Lynchburg showed

significant gains in hands employed, capital investment,
number of establishments, and annual product value between
1850 and 1860.

The statistical data from the census of 1870

reveal a dramatic decline in tobacco production in each of
these cities.
Less than one month after the Confederate surrender
at Appomattox, T.C. Williams, a successful tobacco
manufacturer from Richmond, described conditions he observed
to his close friend and business associate, tobacco magnate
James Thomas, Jr.:
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The loss of property, etc. and the destitution that
must prevail is very great and it will be a long
time if ever before the city and people will recover
from it. Your losses though immense are not as
great as many others, as they lost all. As things
have turned out, you were fortunate.1
The former Confederacy was now a defeated and occupied
nation.

Union soldiers roamed freely over the once

productive Confederate countryside.

Helplessness, doubt,

and confusion engulfed the sentiments of the Southern
people.

Tobacco planters and manufacturers reflected these

same emotions.

Many formerly successful tobacco men now

feared that what little they had left might be confiscated
or heavily taxed by Federal authorities.2

Some even

guestioned whether to attempt to raise a tobacco crop at all
"as the foraging parties were going out and taking
everything."3 At war's end, future tobacco magnates such as
Washington Duke were virtually penniless.

After being

released from a Federal prisoner-of-war camp in New Bern,
North Carolina, Duke walked the 134 miles to his tobacco
farm near Durham with only a silver fifty-cent piece in his
pocket.

Before the war, he had anticipated that tobacco

would be a leading staple in the country.

The large

quantity of tobacco that he had safely stored on his farm
!T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Richmond, 2 May
1865, Thomas Papers.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
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was nearly gone when he arrived home.

His tobacco had been

"pressed” into service by the Union armies of General W.T.
Sherman, and had been distributed all over the Union.

To

make matters worse, his home and tobacco barns were
destroyed.

"What was then considered a calamity by Duke and

others who lost tobacco, ultimately proved to be a great
blessing."4

Duke's story was similar to those of many

tobacconists throughout Virginia and North Carolina after
the war.
The future that faced tobacconists of the former
Confederacy was one filled with the dread of uncertainty.
"The presence of so many soldiers and the constant fear we
are in prevents our having any fixed plans."5 Tobacco
planters, dealers, and merchants found themselves totally at
the mercy of the Federal army.

Questions regarding tobacco

taxes and prices were a serious preoccupation among Southern
tobacconists.

Yankee legal tender was nearly nonexistent in

the hands of most Southerners.

In another letter to James

Thomas, Jr., in early May, Thomas C. Williams remarked that,
"from the day of the evacuation of Richmond I have been
anxious to sell out everything for gold, but there is no
earthly prospect of doing anything of the kind here.

The

4Hiram Paul, History of the Town of Durham, N.C.
(Raleigh: Edwards, Broughton and Co., 1884), 150-52.
5T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 8 May
1865, Thomas Papers.
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money must come from abroad as there is none here."6
The prospects of tobacco confiscation and heavy
taxation by Federal authorities were only two problems which
Southern tobacconists faced.

Planters were also hard-

pressed to find enough field hands to plant, cultivate, and
harvest the tobacco crop.

The skilled and slave labor that

was formerly required in the tobacco cultivation and curing
processes was no longer available.

In the antebellum days,

slaves performed most of the arduous tasks that were
painstakingly executed in order to produce a top-quality
tobacco product.

Former slaves left their masters and

migrated north in search of the promises of good fortune and
freedom.

Over 200,000 slaves were freed in Southside

Virginia alone immediately after the war in 1865.

This

created an immense vacuum in the labor force of Virginia's
postbellum tobacco industry.7 Hired hands had all but
melted away as the Army of Northern Virginia absorbed the
few able-bodied men that were available in the closing
months of the war.

Tobacco planters were forced to split up

their immense plantations into smaller, less labor-intensive
sections.

Freedmen entered into conventions of labor with

former plantation owners and overseers.

Land owners leased

6Ibid.
Catherine S. Perry, History of Farm Tenancy in the
Tobacco Region of Virginia, 1865-1950 (Cambridge: Radcliffe
College Press, 1956), 32.
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their tobacco-producing acreage to tenant farmers, or made
compensatory arrangements with sharecropper farmers.8
Tobacco planters complained that the "Yankees" stole
everything from mules to fence rails;9 barns that had been
destroyed had to be rebuilt.

Vacant or inoperative tobacco

factories that were still standing had to be guarded by
their owners to prevent further destruction to them.10
In some cases the "Yankees" would indeed confiscate
the tobacco of former Confederates and send it north as a
prize or "tithe" of occupation.11 As the realities of defeat
settled upon the South, another compelling obligation
confronted the tobacconists of the former Confederacy—the
loyalty oath and the oath of amnesty.

Under the provisions

of Reconstruction, Federal authorities required that
individuals who formerly supported or sympathized with the
Confederacy take oaths of repentance and loyalty.

This

Federal order affected the hired hand and entrepreneur
alike.12 The consensus among the tobacconists of the former
Confederacy was that the "voluntary" oath of amnesty and
8Ibid., 31-62.
9T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 12 May
1865, Thomas Papers.
10Ibid.
UT.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 14 May
1865, ibid.
12Levi Holbrook to Andrew Johnson, Danville, 3 June
1865, Sutherlin Papers.
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loyalty was actually an act of necessity if one wished to
protect what few possessions one still had left after the
war.

For stubborn tobacconists, a refusal to take "the

oath" was to risk an automatic forfeiture of any remaining
capital assets.13 Radical Republicans in Congress insisted
that former Confederates or even former Confederate
sympathizers "pay" for the damages that the Civil War
created.

The predominant sentiment in Congress at this time

was that the former Confederacy should be punished for
seceding from the Union, and for embracing the repugnant
practice of slavery.
Social and political turmoil in the South continued
to hamper the recovery of the tobacco trade during the later
months of 1865.

Tobacconists frequently complained about

the expensive freight charges ($2 to $3 per hogshead) that
they were expected to pay in transporting their tobacco to
market.14 Planters employed workers under labor agreements
which obligated the tobacco hands "by the month, some until
Christmas, and some for the next year."15 Once hired hands
were secured, the postbellum tobacco planter could harvest
what meager quantities of tobacco he had available.

The

13T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 9 June
18 65, Thomas Papers.
I4T.C. Williams to James Thomas, Jr., Danville, 12 June
1865, ibid.
I5Bird L. Ferrell to P.W. Ferrell, Richmond, 23
November 1865, Sutherlin Papers.
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planter who succeeded in conducting a tobacco harvest that
was even remotely fruitful was still subject to political
developments from Washington.

In January 1866, one

particular Southern planter was advised to have all of his
tobacco "inspected and branded at once.

The radicals think

the Southern people have received too many favors already."16
Commercial progress began to take place in the
tobacco manufacturing centers of Virginia and North Carolina
in 1866.

Mechanization revolutionized the tobacco

manufacturing procedure.

Outing and pressing machines

increased the productivity of manufactured tobacco
significantly.17 New fertilizers were developed; George P.
Kane, co-owner of the Roanoke Tobacco Company (Danville,
Virginia) developed a fertilizer which consisted of ground
bone dust and tobacco dust.

This fertilizer was much more

cost-effective than guano, which was used extensively before
the war.18 Tobacco's place in society changed after the war
as its consumption became more widespread.

Tobacco came

into use in other surprising roles.
Leaf tobacco was used as poultices on human beings
16Frick and Ball to Finney, Carter, and Muse,
Baltimore, 20 January 1866, ibid.
17George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 13 July
1866, the Charles Macgill Papers, Special Collections,
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, N.C. (hereafter
referred to as Macgill Papers).
18George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 23 June
1866, ibid.
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and as a raw material for insecticides to kill
vermin on dogs and cats. Tobacco smoke was used in
greenhouses to kill pests. Stems were used as
fertilizer and brews made from tobacco were used to
destroy grubs on fruit trees and ticks on sheep.19
In an effort to raise capital for insurance and
investment, some postbellum tobacconists offered stock and
an interest in their machinery in exchange for capital
investment.20 With little or no American currency
circulating in the South, tobacco manufacturers were
sometimes forced to lay off employees at their factories.
Low sales and the absence of investors both contributed to
the plight of postbellum tobacconists as well.21
Tobacco manufacturers attempted to revitalize their
pre-war tobacco accounts with dealers in the North and in
Europe.

In late 1866, tobacco price currents published by

the Tobacco Exchange in both Richmond and Petersburg
indicated that modest quantities of the article were being
prized (packaged), inspected, and shipped via the James
River to New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and London.22
19Barbara Napier Bennett, W.T. Sutherlin and the
Danville Tobacco Industry (Greensboro: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974), 71-72.
20George P. Kane to Charles T. Montagne, Danville, 17
July 1866, Macgill Papers.
21George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 25
August 1866, ibid.
21Richmond Price
1867, vol. 1, no. 7.
Richmond, Petersburg,
between 1866 and 1872

Current, Richmond, Virginia, 1 August
Price currents which were published in
and Lynchburg at regular intervals
reveal that the Virginia tobacco
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Tobacco prices fluctuated from 1866 to the early 1870s.
Manufactured tobacco was priced by the pound.
was priced in five-hundred-pound quantities.

Leaf tobacco
The grade or

quality of the manufactured or leaf tobacco determined its
market value.
this time were:

Among the many grades assigned to tobacco at
common, fair, good shipping, common bright,

medium bright, good bright, fine bright, fine English
shipping, and extra fancy.

Common leaf tobacco commanded a

price of $10 to $12 per five hundred pounds.

The extra

fancy grade of leaf was worth anywhere from $75 to $100 per
five hundred pounds.

The prices for manufactured tobacco

ranged from $.14 to $.38 per pound at this time.23
The revenue tax placed upon Southern tobacco (five to
thirty-five cents per pound) put some small tobacco
manufacturers in danger of financial ruin.24 One enraged
tobacconist, George P. Kane of Danville, spoke for many in
the Southern postbellum tobacco community by exclaiming that
"the idea of people paying such taxes for such government as
we have is about the greatest absurdity imaginable.
it the subjugation of our people.

I feel

Not a pound of tobacco

industry was slow to regain the vigor of its antebellum
trade with domestic and foreign markets. For postbellum
statistics on British tobacco importation, please see
Appendix 4.
23Richmond Price Current, Richmond, Virginia, 12
September 1867, vol. 1, no. 13.
24George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 28 July
1866, Macgill Papers.
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can we send from the mill as at present.”25 As 1866 came to
a close, tobacconists faced major questions as to whether to
sell or hold their tobacco stock in light of the perplexing
economic restrictions of the times.26
Tobacco company employees, investors, and
stockholders were all at the mercy of the waning public
demand for the article in early 1867.

Executives who ran

tobacco factories were frequently unable to draw salaries
due to a lack of company capital.27 High taxes and the
shortage of capital investment forced tobacco manufacturers
to raise dramatically the prices of their tobacco products.
Other expenses continued to cut into the capital outlay of
struggling postbellum tobacconists.

Appropriate packaging

and marketing strategies for the tobacco leaf required large
sums of money; some in the business were faced with the
prospect of securing high-interest loans in order to make
ends meet.28
By late 1867, these hardships began to drive some
tobacco manufacturers of the Old South out of business.
25George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 14 July
1866, ibid.
26George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 21
December 1866, ibid.
27George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 21
January 1867, ibid.
28George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 28
September 1867, ibid.
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Many formerly prosperous manufacturers and dealers were on
the brink of bankruptcy.

George P. Kane, president of the

Roanoke Tobacco Co. of Danville, reported to Dr. Charles
Macgill, the chief stockholder of the company, "I have
toiled and written all over the country, but I know and knew
from the start that the only way to sell [tobacco] is for an
owner to travel all the time.”29 Apprehensive manufacturers
of limited financial means commented on "how terribly gloomy
business looks all over the land"30 and that "great anxiety
on the minds of all businessmen here prevails on the minds
of all here."31

In May 1868, George P. Kane remarked that

the continuation of these extenuating economic difficulties
would "end every factory in the South, except perhaps some
few, who have the money, like James Thomas, Jr."32
Many tobacconists throughout the former Confederacy
continued to reel into insolvency in 1868 and 1869.
"Business continued to be depressed as well as spirits."33
The grim provisions of Radical Reconstruction had a
29George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 18
October 1867, ibid.
30George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 25
February 1868, ibid.
31William Barrett to William J. Pendleton, Richmond, 13
March 1868, Pendleton Papers.
32George P. Kane to Charles Macgill, Danville, 29 May
1868, Macgill Papers.
33William Barrett to Madison Pendleton, Richmond, 4
February 1869, Pendleton Papers.
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suffocating effect on even the most financially secure
planters and manufacturers of tobacco.

The devastating

effects of war and Reconstruction were too great for the
Southern tobacco industry to immediately recover from.

It

would take the tobacco business another ten years following
the end of Reconstruction in Virginia to slowly return to
its former level of economic and commercial importance in
the South.34
In I860, at least six of ten large manufacturers
surveyed in Richmond had a capital value exceeding $150,000.
The four "smaller" tobacco firms had a capital value which
exceeded $30,000.

The tobacco manufacturing firms of

Patterson and Williams, Turpin and Yarbrough, R.A. Mayo, and
W.R. Robinson all were worth in excess of $30,000 in 1860.
The capital value of the larger manufacturers was
impressive.

Thomas and Samuel Hardgrove and the firm of

W.H. Grant were each worth at least $150,000 each.

J.H.

Grant's enterprise was valued at between $400,000 and
$500,000.

D.B. and N.W. Harris were worth $500,000.

The

two largest tobacco manufacturers in Richmond, James Thomas,
Jr. and William Barrett were each worth over $600,000 in
^Please refer to Appendix 14 on page 131 and Appendix
15 on page 132. These statistics reflect the reduction in
tobacco production in Virginia during the postbellum period
of 1865 to 1870.
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The fortunes of these manufacturers changed
significantly because of the war.

Five of the ten

manufacturers surveyed in 1860 were out of business after
1865.

The tobacco firm of D.B. and N.W. Harris was

destroyed in a cavalry raid by General Philip Sheridan in
1864.

The five firms which survived the war enjoyed varying

degrees of prosperity after 1867.

By 1867, James Thomas,

Jr. was again worth $500,000, regaining the prosperity he
enjoyed before the war.

By 1868, Turpin and Yarbrough had

also restored prosperity to their enterprises.

William

Barrett was perhaps the most resilient and prosperous of the
tobacco manufacturers of the immediate postbellum period.
He was worth nearly $1,000,000 in 1868.

R.A. Patterson, a

nephew of James Thomas, Jr., and his partner, Thomas C.
Williams, achieved a capital value of $800,000 by 1870.
Williams became the personal attorney for James Thomas, Jr.
after the war.

Their relationship extended beyond

friendship into business.

Patterson and Williams continued

to enjoy the advice and financial support of James Thomas,
Jr. until his death at the age of seventy-six in 1882.
Patterson and Williams continued to prosper in the tobacco
35A11 of the financial citations referred to above were
taken from the R.G. Dun and Co. Collection, Special
Collections, Baker Library, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts,
1849-1890. All individual citations are listed in Appendix
1 on page 113.
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manufacturing business well into the 1880s.36
The southern tobacco industry continued to re-emerge
and grow in the 1870s.

It developed gradually into a

modern, thriving economic giant.

Ironically, the war

provided a stimulus to the production of tobacco in the late
1870s by introducing soldiers of the Union and Confederate
armies to the weed.

"Chewing was no longer accepted in many

social circles, but hand-rolled cigarettes became very
popular since they were no longer considered to be
effeminate."37 James Bonsack's invention of the cigarette
manufacturing machine revolutionized the southern tobacco
industry forever.

"In 1876, his machine-made cigarettes

were introduced at the Philadelphia Exposition.1,38 Handrolled cigarettes became a thing of the past as a result of
Bonsack's invention.

"A rapid cigarette-maker, by hand,

could make 2,500 a day.

In only ten hours, the Bonsack

machine could produce 120,000 cigarettes, the equivalent of
a day's work for forty-eight laborers I"39 The tobacco firm
of Allen and Ginter was the first company in Richmond to
employ the Bonsack machine; Washington Duke and Sons, Co.
was the first company in North Carolina to do so.

Duke's

36Ibid.
37Bennett, 71.
38Ibid.
39Paul, 208.
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American Tobacco Company emerged in the mid-1880s as one of
the most productive and prosperous tobacco manufacturers in
America.40 By 1883, Duke was manufacturing 250,000
cigarettes a day, and was exporting tobacco not only all
over the country, but to sixteen foreign countries as well.41
After being nearly destroyed by the Civil War, the tobacco
industry of the former Confederacy inevitably surpassed its
accomplishments of the antebellum period.
The Confederate policy of "King Tobacco" diplomacy
failed for several important reasons.

The Confederacy

mismanaged the potential economic and political value of
tobacco.

Confederate policy was inevitably far more

detrimental than war to the economic and political potential
that tobacco presented to the interests of the Confederate
States of America.

Confederate tobacco policy was

inconsistent, contradictory, and misconstrued by
legislators.

Poorly-designed tax policy and harmful

legislation prevented tobacco from becoming the valuable
asset the Confederacy had hoped it would be.

Four of the

five factors which contributed to the eventual paralysis of
the Confederacy's domestic tobacco trade were byproducts of
war:
•

the commercial chaos which gripped the industry

40Ibid.
41Ibid. , 111-12.
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immediately after the Confederate attack on Fort
Sumter;
•

transportation and communications disruptions;

•

the capture or destruction of tobacco by Federal
armies; and

•

impressment of tobacco and capital by Federal
armies.

Yet, it was the Confederacy itself that had the most
damaging influence on its domestic tobacco trade.
Inappropriate policies regarding tobacco taxation and
legislation were far more harmful to the well-being of its
tobacco industry than the war was.
Confederate interests in the international tobacco
trade were undermined by two principal factors:
•

the successful implementation of the Federal
blockade of Southern ports from the Potomac to the
Rio Grande; and

•

the emergence of alternative sources of tobacco in
Europe.

Although some Confederate tobacco did break through the
blockade via foreign vessels and Confederate blockade
runners, the flow of tobacco from southern ports to European
customers was progressively snuffed out between May 18 61 and
December 1863.

As a result, European consumers began to

patronize other countries for a steady and reliable source
of tobacco.

By 1863, the Confederate international tobacco
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trade was essentially neutralized by the Federal blockade
and by the competition of foreign tobacco-producing nations.
Diplomatically, tobacco was used as a bargaining chip
by the Confederacy in an effort to gain independent status
and official political recognition from the world's greatest
economic and military powers, Great Britain and France.
Over the course of the war, tobacco played a primary role in
several international diplomatic crises:
•

the Hiawatha and Tropic Wind incidents;

•

the Trent affair;

•

the Franco-Confederate attempt to ship Frenchowned tobacco from Richmond through the blockade.

In each case, tobacco (or the promise of tobacco) failed to
bring the Confederacy the military assistance and diplomatic
recognition it so desperately desired.

Tobacco was simply

not diplomatically enticing enough to the French or British
to risk war with the United States.
Statistics compiled in the census of 1860 bear
witness to the fact that the southern antebellum tobacco
industry had no global rival immediately before the Civil
War.

Only cotton was more economically profitable and

politically valuable than tobacco to the South in 1861.

The

tobacco statistics reported in the census of 1870
demonstrate the devastating impact that the war had on the
Confederate tobacco industry.

Production capital value

figures of the postwar years reveal why it took nearly
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fifteen years for the southern tobacco trade to re-emerge as
an eminent economic industry.

By all accounts, tobacco

played a vital role in the interests of the South from 1850
to 1880; it was second in economic and political importance
only to cotton during the Confederate era.
Historians have thoroughly examined the political and
economic role that cotton played in southern affairs during
the Confederate era.

No study has been conducted which

examines the valuable role that tobacco played in southern
commerce and diplomacy from 1850 to 1880.

Research that has

been done in regard to tobacco and Confederate policy is
nearly nonexistent due to the absence of statistical data
from 1861 to 1865.
Joseph C. Robert's The Tobacco Kingdom is a welldocumented study of the history of tobacco production in
Virginia from 1800 to 1860.

Robert relies mainly upon the

statistical data found in the census reports of this period
in his text.

He also does an admirable job of providing

biographical profiles of tobacco planters and manufacturers.
The major shortcoming of Robert's work is his failure to
address the role that tobacco played in Confederate affairs
from 1861 to 1865.

Robert fails to address the role that

tobacco played in Confederate domestic policy, foreign
trade, and foreign diplomacy.

He also fails to mention the

rise of the southern tobacco industry in the postbellum era.
B.W. Arnold's History of the Tobacco Industry in
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Virginia from 1860 to 1894 is almost entirely dependent upon
the census returns of 1860, 1870, 1880, and 1890.

His text

is relatively short; his narration simply ties his
statistical citations together.

Again, Arnold makes no

mention whatsoever of tobacco and its role in Confederate
affairs during the war.
Barbara N. Bennett and Katherine S. Perry have each
written monographs which discuss the southern tobacco
industry in the postbellum period.

Bennett's William T.

Sutherlin and the Danville Tobacco Industry discusses the
influence that Sutherlin had on the tobacco trade of
Pittsylvania County, Virginia, from 1867 to 1894.

Perry's

History of Farm Tenancy in the Tobacco Region of Virginia
describes the rise of tenant farming and sharecropping in
the tobacco belt of Virginia from 1865 to 1950.
Several authors have written articles or done brief
studies of specific cases involving tobacco and Confederate
affairs.

Warren F. Spencer's "French Tobacco in Richmond"

is an excellent, detailed account of the most important
tobacco-related diplomatic affair of the Civil War.
Mountague Bernard briefly examines a tobacco-related subject
in his book, A Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great
Britain during the American Civil War.

Bernard explores the

arena of international law as it applied to Federal prize
court cases which involved the detention of tobacco-laden
ships of foreign registry.
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None of the authors mentioned above addresses the
vital issues which involved tobacco and Confederate policy.
Monographs and articles which do investigate the southern
tobacco industry fail to examine the article at its most
critical moment in southern history:
War.

the American Civil

Warren F. Spencer, Bingham Duncan, Frank L. Olmstead,

and M.L. Bonham, Jr. have all published valuable articles
which shed some light on the role that tobacco played in the
South during the Confederate era.
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APPENDIX 1
THE CAPITAL WORTH OF VIRGINIA TOBACCO
MANUFACTURERS (in dollars)
TOBACCONIST1

CITY

1849-1850

1858-1859

POST-1865

Thomas and Samuel
Hardgrove2

Richmond

$30,00040,000

$150,000200,000

Out of Business

James Thomas, Jr.3

Richmond

$40,00050,000

$500,000600,000

$400,000500,000 in 18674

J.H. Grant5

Richmond

$25,000

$400,000500,000

Out of Business

Turpin and
Yarbrough6

Richmond

Not
available

$40,00050,000

$40,000-50,000
in 1868

W.H. Grant7

Richmond

$75,000100,000

$150,000200,000

Out of Business

William Barrett8

Richmond

$30,00040,000

$600,000700,000

$500,0001,000,000 1868

R.A. Mayo9

Richmond

Not
available

$50,00060,000

Out of Business

R.A. Patterson and
T.C. Williams'0

Richmond

Not in
Business

$25,00030,000

$800,000 in
1870"

W.R. Robinson'2

Richmond

$40,000 in
1855

$50,00060,000

Out of Business

D.B. and N.W.
Harris'3

Louisa Co.

Not
available

$500,000

Business
destroyed by
Sheridan in
1864

James Fisher14

Manchester

$15,00020,000

Failed in
1858

—

'All of the citations below were taken from R.G. Dun and Co.
Collection, Special Collections, Baker Library, Graduate School of
Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.
2Va. vol. 43, 48.
3Ibid., 87.
“Ibid., 44, 224.
5Ibid., 43, 102.
6Ibid., 103.
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7Ibid., 103.
8Ibid., 104.
’Ibid., 244.
l0Ibid., 372.
Ibid., 44, 224
Ibid., 43, 243
Ibid., 24, 286
'“Ibid., 43, 87.
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APPENDIX 2
ANTEBELLUM TOBACCONISTS
Among the many national tobacconists of the 1850s were the
following. They are organized by geographic region (North,
Deep South, West) and by city (Boston, New York, Baltimore,
etc.) (compiled from James Thomas letters and other
sources). This list is limited to those tobacconists cited
in Chapter 2.
Northern Firms
Boston

W.H. Wilkinson
G. W. Abbott
Fisher and Co.
J.H. and S.G. Thayer
J.B. Carroll
Portland (Maine)
William H. Price
New York
Charles M. Connolly
Ludlam and Heineken
J.A. and T.A. Patterson
J .R .S . Pendleton
G.W. Hillman and Co.
Bucknor and McCammon
Philadelphia
Motzer and Brehm
James Wilson
Baltimore
Jacob Heald
Thomas B. Skinner
Claiborne, Ferguson and Co.
Kennett, Dudley and Co.
Cincinnati
Chillicothe (Ohio) Samuel T. DeFan

Southern Firms
Richmond

Morton Armstead
J.H. Motley
D.T. Williams
Dean, Brown, and Co.
George W. Allen
E.J. Collier
Danville
R.A. Miles
Hill and Warren
Fredericksburg
Whillacke (N.C.)
Thomas E. Barksdale
Cedar Grove (N.C ) Thomas W. Lindsey
J.C. Glenn and Co.
New Orleans
Wills and Rawlins
115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116

Southern Firms (cont'd).
(New Orleans)
Van Benthuysen and Crofton
J.T. Doswell
Charleston
Adams Frost and Co.
Mobile
Robert T . Dade
Portsmouth (Va.)
Buskirk and Davis and Co.
Jackson (Miss.)
Fears and Putnam
Oglethorpe (G a .)
John W. Babb
Western Firms
San Francisco
St. Louis
Louisville
Chicago

J.H. Coghill
A.J. Seemullen
Thomas Mullin
John Ward
G. Frankenthal
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APPENDIX 3
FOREIGN TOBACCO DEALERS
Nearly a dozen foreign tobacco dealers were in constant
communication with the most prominent tobacco planters and
manufacturers of the Richmond area throughout the 1850s.
These dealers continued to do business with Southern tobacco
concerns throughout the war despite the limitations of
inflation, market fluctuation, communication, and the
Federal naval blockade of Confederate ports. The following
firms were the most important foreign tobacco companies
involved in the international tobacco trade immediately
before and during the American Civil War. Please refer to
footnoted citations in the text for additional foreign
tobacco firms which patronized Confederate tobacconists
during the war.
Mailler, Lord, and Quereau of Melbourne and Adelaide
William Oxley and Son of Liverpool
D. McPherson and Co. of Melbourne and Sydney
Greene, Heath, and Allen of Melbourne and San
Francisco
John K. Gilliat and Co. of London and Liverpool
H.H. Meier and Co. of Bremen
Fisher, Ricards, and Co. of Melbourne and New York
D.H. Watjen and Co. of Bremen
Boninger, Kramer and Co. of Bremen
Mees and Moens of Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Robert Edwards of London and Liverpool
Robert Somervail of Liverpool
G.F. Davis and Co. of London
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APPENDIX 4
VALUE OF TOBACCO IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM
(1855-1870)

YEAR

VALUE
(IN £000,000)

1855

1.6

1856

2.2

1857

2.2

1858

2.5

1859

1.8

1860

1.8

1861

2.2

1862

2.4

1863

3.0

1864

3.4

1865

3.3

1866

2.6

1867

2.4

1868
1869

2.3
2.3

1870

2.4

Source: B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical
Statistics (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), 298.
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APPENDIX 5
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF RICHMOND IN 1850

NAME OF TOBACCONIST
James Thomas, Jr.
Poiteaux Robinson
J.L. Liggons
J.J. Goode
B.L. Turpin
R.A. Mayo
W.R. Myers
Hoorich and Bro.
George Mills
James Fisher
L.L. Saunders
Gilliam and Matthews
John Enders
Turpin and Yarbrough
N.B. Hill and Co.
William Barrett
P .B . Harwood
R.D. Christian
William Graner and Son
Thomas and Samuel
Hardgrove
J.H. Grant
E.A. Smith
W.H. Grant
C.P. Wood

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)
600,000
1,000,000
250,000
300,000
166,000
270,000
1,000,00C
201,189
613,963
300,000
275,000
630,000
500,000
300,000
250,000
400,000
225,000
160,000
600,000
900,000
1,320,000
235,000
600,000
200,000

VALUE (in
dollars)
120,000
150,000
62,500
75,000
26,000
45,000
350,000
43,000
95,000
42,000
38,500
80,000
90,000
54,000
45,000
100,000
37,000
28,900
108,000
225,000
198,000
33,750
85,000
30,000

Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Henrico Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 6
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF LYNCHBURG IN 1850

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
NAME OF TOBACCONIST________PRODUCED (in pounds)
40,000
Granville Jordan
157,000
Norwich and Otey
James Saunders
300,000
150,000
McCorkle and Simpson
J.L. Clayton
190,000
J.L. Brown
320,000
M. Langhorne and Sons
100,000
J.P. Knight
100,000
Tyler and Anderson
200,000
Halsey and Crenshaw
140,000
Augustus Leftwich
120,000
N .S . Loyd
220,000
John Boisseau
100,000
Scholfield and Lewis
120,000
W.L. Saunders
220,000
William Crompton
150,000
W.P. Allison
120,000
W.H. Langhorne and Co.
110,000
Roberts and Sisson
200,000
T.P. Nash
200,000
Seldon and Anthony
200,000
Buston and Mayo
100,000
G.W. Warwick
130,000
Cabaniss and Armistead
300,000
A.H. Armistead
110,000
W.D. Miller
350,000
Dudley and John
—

VALUE (in
dollars)
8 000
30 000
50 000
30 000
33 000
20 000
75 000
15 000
20 000
20 000
30 000
25 000
45 000
20 000
40 000
50 000
30 000
18 000
18 000
40 000
40 000
45 000
20 000
20 000
60 000
22 000
88 000
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NAME
E.T.
A.B.
John

OF TOBACCONIST
Williams
Gaulett
Rucker

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)
180,000
15,000
200,000

VALUE (in
dollars)
28,000
3,000
25,000

Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Campbell Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 7
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF DANVILLE IN 1850
QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds)

VALUE (in
dollars)

W.H. and J.H. Payne

75,000

10 000

S.W. Lanier

40,000

4 000

Griggs and Garrant

42,000

4 500

Pritchill and Hutchinson

75,000

8 000

Kern and Watkins

75,000

8 000

Bartlett Joiner

53,000

7 500

Williams and Granley

50,000

8 000

J.A. May

50,000

5 000

Miller and Trotter

35,000

5 100

W.D. Williams

28,000

3 500

W.W. Kean

80,000

10 000

Wellington Witches

20,000

3 200

A. Barksdale

600,000

Miller and Tisler

150,000

96 000
20 000

Anderson and Co.

200,000

25 000

Wills and Anderson

500,000

60 000

Hebron Johns

750,000

90 000

Samuel Berger

30,000

6 700

John Swanson

32,500

7 875

112,500

20 200

12,000

1 500

William Ayers

200,000

33 000

Holing and Walk

350,000

45 000

Holland and Law

215,000

32 000

John W. Holland

90,892

14 500

Jones and Watkins
Joab Watson
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NAME OF TOBACCONIST

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)

VALUE (in
dollars)

Laird Brown

275,000

33,000

W.T. Sutherlin

370,000

35,000

Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Pittsylvania Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).
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APPENDIX 8
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF FARMVILLE IN 1850

NAME OF TOBACCONIST

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)

VALUE (in
dollars)

J.W. Dunnington

300,000

20,000

Williams and Venable

100,000

6,000

George Daniel

225,000

26,500

80,000

15,000

176,000

28,000

Read and Carrington
C .C . Read

Source: U.S. Census, 1850: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Prince Edward Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1853).

124

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX 9
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF RICHMOND IN 1860
QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds)
John W. Atkinson

VALUE (in
dollars)

450,000

90,000

Baker, Pleasants, and
Frayser
Bond and Talbott

64,466

22,485

250,000

40,000

South and McCurdy

400,000

65,000

William Graner

700,000

140,000

Faunley and Walsh

154,000

29,500

John E. Whitlock

200,000

90,000

Jones and Thornton

387,905

65,945

50,000

10,000

P.A. Blackborn

500,000

100,000

J .B . Legan

250,000

45,000

Christian and Sell

700,000

190,000

W.R. Robinson

390,400

80,500

21,875

2,087

E.S. Turpin and Co.

475,000

70,000

C .E . Kent

500,000

98,000

J.H. Greanor

600,000

155,000

1,350,000
750,000

245,000

A.W. Taylor

300,000

50,000

Turpin and Yarbrough

700,000

175,000

Washington Ross

350,000

70,000

S.M. Bailey

500,000

115,000

W.J. Westscn

200,000

40,000

G.P. and J.H. Wood

536,961

100,000

Hunt and Hail

Samuel Gaithwright

W.R. Grant
J .P . Royster

200,000
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NAME OF TOBACCONIST

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)

VALUE (in
dollars)

Coleman Wortham

436,000

100,000

Patterson and Williams

450,000

90,000

John F. Allen

200,000

60,000

Crew and Pemberton

550,000

90,000

Robert J. Higgins

250,000

42,500

W.A. Grant

500,000

140,000

William Garrett

590,000

105,200

R.M. Stevenson

350,000

50,000

A.R. Thomas

660,000

150,000

35,000

2,800

Cosby and Anderson

500,000

100,000

Sydnor and Anderson

320,000

57,600

1,100,000

225,000

T.L. Timberlake

200,000

36,000

J .H .F . Mayo

600,000

72,000

J.H. Gentry and Co.

500,000

125,000

James Downing

400,000

72,000

J.D. Harwood

450,000

100,000

R.A. Mayo

315,000

80,000

Thomas and Samuel
Hardgrove

800,000

190,000

Roddy and Strother

500,000

75,000

J.D. Blair

250,000

32,000

E.H. Simpson

James Thomas, Jr.

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Henrico Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 10
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF LYNCHBURG IN 1860
QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
NAME OF TOBACCONIST_______ PRODUCED (in pounds)
Cabell and Whitehead

VALUE (in
dollars)

250,000

30,000

1,000,000

80,000

Jesse Kease

270,000

50,000

J.M. Becker

300,000

60,000

McCorkle and Co.

200,000

30,000

M. Langhorne and Son

360,000

80,000

A.A. Read and Son

192,000

40,000

30,000

3,500

James Knight

200,000

23,895

John Knight

100,000

18,000

W.D. Miller

200,000

25,000

J.W. Carroll

123,000

35,000

C.D. Mafair

320,000

50,000

Woodroof Factory

300,000

50,000

Augustine Leftwich

Piedmont Factory

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Campbell Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 11
TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS OF DANVILLE IN 1860

NAME OF TOBACCONIST

QUANTITY OF
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO
PRODUCED (in pounds)

VALUE (in
dollars)

Sutherlin and Ferrell

255,000

70,000

S.H. Holland

150,000

40,000

J.B. Pace

160,000

25,000

J.J. Hawkins

120,000

21,600

J.H. Pemberton

300,000

54,000

W.T. Sutherlin

435,000

97,732

G.W. Williams

600,000

20,000

J.R. Miller and Son

25,000

E.W. Dixon

105,000
57,000

J.H. Trotter

100,000

23,000

R. Williams

60,000

16,000

T .R . Trotter

97,500

24,000

J.W. Holland

270,000

68,000

10,500

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule,
Virginia, Pittsylvania Co. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 12
RAW TOBACCO PRODUCTION IN THE SOUTHERN
STATES IN 1850 AND 1860 (in pounds)
1850

1860

Virginia

56,803,227

123,968,312

North Carolina

11,984,786

32,853,250

Tennessee

20,148,932

43,448,097

Missouri

17,113,784

25,086,196

Maryland

21,407,497

38,410,965

Kentucky

55,501,196

108,126,840

199,735,993

434,183,561

All Southern States

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, Virginia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 13
MANUFACTURED TOBACCO PRODUCTION FOR VIRGINIA,
THE SOUTHERN STATES, AND THE UNITED STATES
IN 1850 AND 1860

VA
(1850)

USA
(1850)

VA
(1860)

SOUTHERN
STATES
(1860)

USA
(1860)

209

1,418

261

409

626

Capital Invest
ment (in $)

1,412,471

5,008,295

3,856,990

5,475,938

9,484,988

Cost of Raw
Tobacco (in $)

3,017,904

7,341,728

7,163,943

8,598,024 13,024,988

4,802

12,261

9,572

11,321

15,869

477

1,975

1,810

2,300

2,990

597,240

2,420,208

2,123,732

2,425,040

3,571,294

No. Establish
ments

Male Hands
Female Hands
Annual Cost of
Labor (in $)
Annual Value of
Product (in $)

5,157,652 13,491,141 12,236,683 14,612,442 21,820,535

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1863) .
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APPENDIX 14
TOBACCO PRODUCTION OF MANUFACTURERS IN
CAMPBELL, PITTSYLVANIA, HENRICO, DINWIDDIE
cOuNTIES IN 1860
CAMPBELL
COUNTY
No. Establish
ments
Capital Invest
ment (in $)
Cost of Raw
Tobacco (ir. $)
Male Hands
Female Hands
Annual Cost of
Labor (in $)
Annual Value of
Product (in $)

PITTSYLVANIA
COUNTY

HENRICO
COUNTY

DINWIDDIE
COUNTY

47

39

52

20

787,690

258,000

1,121,025

587,000

1,197,437

767,071

2,882,415

1,056,170

1,310

829

3,370

1,676

279

220

34

840

263,580

269,316

714,384

469,752

2,081,149

1,031,544

4,838,995

2,167,202

Source: U.S. Census, 1860: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States, Virginia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1863).
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APPENDIX 15
TOBACCO MANUFACTURED IN LEADING COUNTIES IN VIRGINIA, 1870

COUNTY

NO. ES
HANDS
TABLISH
MENTS
EMPLOYED

CAPITAL
(in $)

WAGES
(in $)

MATERIALS
(in $)

PRODUCT
VALUE
(in $)

Henrico

38

3,970

580,500

688,820

2,384,787

3,984,918

Dinwiddie

15

1,739

384,550

299,965

1,022,658

1,819,286

Pittsyl
vania

8

601

70,800

52,600

245,836

456,631

Henry

4

147

73,000

10,680

62,505

131,000

Bedford

5

176

37,000

24,500

80,929

117,370

97

32,000

24,850

58,888

104,771

Chester
field
Campbell

2

Not Available

Source: U.S. Census, 1870: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1872) .
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APPENDIX 16
POSTBELLUM TOBACCO PRODUCTION, 1870
USA
Establishments

VIRGINIA

NORTH CAROLINA

5,204

131

111

2,688

239

178

25

-

402

60

-

26

2

-

Altogether

47,848

7,534

1,465

Males 16+

31,997

4,365

763

Females 15+

7,794

1,312

332

Youth

8,057

1,857

370

Steam Engines
Horsepower
Number

-

Water Wheels
Horsepower
Number
Hands Employed

Capital (in $)

24,924,330

1,391,925

375,882

Wages (in $)

14,315,342

1,181,418

102,144

Material Used (in
S)

34,656,607

4,082,181

391,027

Tobacco Product
Value (in $)

71,762,044

7,054,770

718,765

Source: U.S. Census, 1870: Manufacturing Schedule, United
States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1872) .
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